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ABSTRACT 
 The aircraft combat survivability (ACS) design discipline has proven effective in 
producing survivable combat aircraft for over fifty years. Currently, the discipline only 
focuses on kinetic threats; however, an emerging class of cyber weapons has brought 
forth a new challenge in the endless fight between attackers and defenders. Cyber is a 
legitimate anti-aircraft threat, and the recent rise in cyber-related incidents raises major 
concern for our military and its ability to carry out mission objectives. While the attack 
vectors and damage mechanisms of cyber weapons are fundamentally different from 
those of traditional kinetic threats, modifying the fundamental ACS concepts can help 
produce cyber-survivable combat aircraft. This research lays the groundwork for 
expanding the ACS design discipline fundamentals to include emerging anti-aircraft 
cyber threats. In this new aircraft cyber combat survivability (ACCS) design discipline, 
ACS terms are redefined to address cyber threats and a new cyber kill chain is proposed 
to help assess an aircraft’s cyber-survivability. The development of 12 survivability 
enhancement concepts aims to assist program managers and engineers in designing 
platforms that are better equipped to survive in a hostile cyber environment. An approach 
to modeling cyber-attacks using the ACCS probabilistic kill chain shows how to assess 
an aircraft’s cyber-survivability and demonstrates the effectiveness of survivability 
enhancement features. 
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The primary mission of our nation’s armed forces is to support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic. One of the first 
steps toward ensuring that this mission is met is ensuring that combat platforms are able to 
survive in man-made, hostile environments. Adversaries are more combat-capable now 
than they have ever been. It is therefore critical that today’s combat systems are not only 
mission capable, but resistant to the conventional and emerging threats that make up 
today’s warfighting landscape.  
One part of warfighting is achieving our objectives; the other part is denying the 
enemy theirs. Today’s adversaries are constantly scheming ways to prevent our forces from 
carrying out our missions successfully. For the past century, adversaries have been getting 
better at firing more powerful, more accurate, and more dangerous weapons at our combat 
platforms. And for the past century, project managers and engineers have been designing 
combat platforms to better survive attacks from such weapons.  
Hundreds of thousands of aircraft have been lost in combat since the early twentieth 
century. To address these losses, the Aircraft Combat Survivability (ACS) design discipline 
was formally established to protect aircraft operating in man-made hostile environments 
(Ball, 2003). The current ACS discipline was born from historical data and deals almost 
entirely with protecting aircraft against kinetic energy anti-aircraft weapons (guns and 
guided missiles). Until relatively recently, kinetic energy weapons (KEWs) have been the 
only significant threat to combat aircraft.  
However, the rapid growth of technology in the past few decades, especially in the 
cyber domain, has given adversaries new tools to disrupt, degrade, deny, and destroy our 
combat systems. Our fighting force is becoming increasingly reliant on systems that 
operate in cyberspace as more capable, complex systems are developed and introduced into 
our nation’s military. Every line of flight hardware, every small maintenance software 
update, and every bit of data transferred from mission planning computers to onboard smart 
weapons exposes our combat aircraft to potential cyber-based attacks.  
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The fundamentals of the ACS discipline were specifically designed with kinetic 
threats in mind, but these concepts can be more broadly applied to address new, emerging 
threats in cyber. While the attack vectors and damage mechanisms associated with cyber 
threats are fundamentally different than those associated with traditional, kinetic energy 
weapons, designing cyber-survivable systems can be done by applying the same ACS 
fundamentals to emerging cyber threats.  
The ultimate goal of this thesis is to provide program managers and engineers tools 
for designing combat platforms capable of avoiding or withstanding dysfunctions caused 
by anti-aircraft cyber weapons. The rest of this chapter will discuss why the ACS design 
discipline was developed and why there is a need to expand the design discipline 
fundamentals to evolving cyber threats. Chapter II will provide an overview of the ACS 
fundamentals and how they are used to calculate and enhance survivability as it relates to 
kinetic attacks. Chapter III briefly defines the cyber domain and discusses why and how 
cyber could be used as an anti-aircraft weapon. Chapter IV applies ACS fundamentals to 
cyber threats. Chapter V introduces cyber survivability enhancement concepts that can be 
used to design combat platforms that are less susceptible and less vulnerable to cyber-
attacks. Chapter VI models a cyber-attack using the probabilistic kill chain introduced in 
Chapter IV and shows how enhancement concepts can improve aircraft survivability. 
Chapter VII highlights conclusions and identifies further areas of research. 
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE AIRCRAFT COMBAT SURVIVABILITY 
DESIGN DISCIPLINE 
Combat aircraft have been flying missions since the early twentieth century when 
the Wright Military Flyer was first used by the U.S. Army in 1909 (Maksel, 2010). World 
War I introduced the first widespread use of aerial combat and officially made the skies a 
warfighting battlespace. At the time, pilots would fly at altitudes beyond the range of 
enemy ground defenses, would sit on metal lids to offer additional shielding, and would 
carry small firearms to suppress enemy threats (Ball, 2003). The idea of designing and 
operating aircraft that could survive in a hostile, combat environment was already in 
practice by the end of World War I in 1918. 
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It was not until the 1970s, however, that the survivability of combat aircraft became 
a formal design discipline. The Aircraft Combat Survivability design discipline came as a 
response to the more than 4,000 aircraft lost in the 1964-1973 Southeast Asia conflict (Ball, 
2003). In 1971, the Department of Defense (DoD) established the Joint Technical 
Coordination Group on Aircraft Survivability, whose mission was to protect aircraft from 
anti-aircraft guns and guided missiles. In 1985, the American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics (AIAA) published Dr. Bob Ball’s textbook, The Fundamentals of Aircraft 
Combat Survivability Analysis and Design, officially introducing ACS as a design 
discipline. 
Over the last fifty years, this design discipline has grown and has been successfully 
implemented for a number of combat aircraft platforms. The number of aircraft combat 
losses during that time span has dropped significantly (Ball, 2003). The ACS discipline is 
now an integral part of the DoD acquisition process, survivability requirements are 
commonplace in project management, and testing and evaluation of combat systems is 
congressionally mandated (Ball & Bryant, 2020a). It is important to note that, while the 
ACS discipline is specific to aircraft, the fundamentals of survivability can be applied to 
any combat or even non-combative platform. Ships and ground vehicles must also be able 
to survive in hostile, combat environments; while some of the examples that Dr. Ball uses 
may not be entirely applicable to every type of combat platform, the broader survivability 
concepts can be very useful. 
As combat aircraft have evolved drastically over the last fifty years, so too have the 
threats to combat aircraft. In 1971, when the ACS design discipline was first imagined, 
unconventional weapons (biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons), electromagnetic 
weapons, and cyber-weapons were never considered realistic threats. Design decisions 
were not made with these threats in-mind. Things have changed since 1971 and these 
threats cannot be ignored. Attacks on combat platforms in the cyber domain pose a real 
and credible threat that should be considered when designing and operating these 
platforms.  
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B. EVOLUTION OF CYBER CONFLICT AND EXPANDING THE ACS 
DESIGN DISCIPLINE 
The world we live in, and the world that our military operates in, is increasingly 
dependent on networks of systems that run on a series of 1’s and 0’s. Unfortunately, many 
of these cyber-systems were not designed with combat survivability in mind; they were 
designed to operate in an uncontested, permissive environment (Bryant, 2016). Every year, 
state-based cyber power and cyber weaponry are growing more advanced and the potential 
damage from a state-based cyber-attack is becoming more severe (Maness, 2020b).  
In 2019, the World Economic Forum (WEF) released a report based on surveys of 
750 experts and decision makers (Figure 1). The report found cyber-attacks as one of the 
most likely and one of the most catastrophic risks to the global landscape, just behind 




Figure 1. The global risk landscape. Source: World Economic Forum (2019). 
The U.S. DoD has started to address the potential threat that cyber poses. In 2018, 
Secretary of Defense Patrick M. Shanahan stated at the Air Force Association’s Annual 
Conference that, “Cybersecurity is, probably going to be what we call the ‘fourth critical 
measurement.’ We’ve got quality, cost, schedule, but security is one of those measures that 
we need to hold people accountable for” (Mehta, 2018, para. 3). In 2020, the DoD 
mandated that Program Managers safeguard their systems from cyber-attacks, design for 
the cyber threat environment, and manage cybersecurity impacts (Department of Defense). 
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In just the last decade, U.S. cybersecurity spending has almost doubled, from a reported 
twenty-nine billion dollars in 2010 to sixty-five billion dollars reported in 2018 (Ashworth, 
2020). During that same time frame however, the number of cyber incidents shot up 
dramatically as well, from less than half a million in 2010 to nearly sixty million in 2018. 
It is clear that the DoD believes that cyber is a legitimate and powerful threat to our fighting 
force, but, while some progress is being made to address this emerging risk, more still 
needs to be done. 
New technologies have raised issues, and continue to raise issues, in international 
civil-military relations. For example, most people had no idea the extent to which the role 
of nuclear weapons and nuclear power was going to play in international affairs prior to 
World War II because nuclear power was never previously regarded as a legitimate threat. 
It was not until the path to chaos and destruction was made clear that nations started to 
focus on developing, regulating, and safeguarding access to nuclear energy. Cyber seems 
as if it may be following a similar path. Nations will not take cyber-threats seriously until 
the path to chaos and destruction in the cyber domain is made clear (Maness, 2020a).  
The potential impact of an all-out cyber war (a war in which “unauthorized actions 
by a nation-state to penetrate another nation’s computers or networks for the purposes of 
causing damage, disruption, or theft of classified, restricted, or proprietary information or 
materials” (Jackson, 2012, p. 304) is the goal) could be catastrophic. It may just be a matter 
of time before the full effects of cyber warfare are apparent. With the millions of pieces of 
hardware and software components needed to operate technologically complex combat 
platforms worldwide, the attack surface is so large and the rate of technological 
development is so fast that it is hard to imagine a scenario where large-scale cyber conflict 
is not possible (Kollars, 2018). 
Ben Buchanan (2016), an expert in the field of international cyber conflict, believed 
that, given the level of complexity of modern cyber-systems, determined and technically-
competent hackers would always find a way to infiltrate our systems. In his professional 
opinion, cyber defense cannot be assured because “adept programmers will [inevitably] 
find vulnerabilities and overcome security measures” (p. 108) It is therefore imperative not 
only to defend our cyber-systems to prevent an adversary from gaining access, but also to 
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design systems capable of surviving those situations in which an adversary does 
successfully gain access. Our systems should be designed not only to avoid, but also to 
withstand a cyber-based attack from an advanced persistent threat (APT).   
Attacks like Stuxnet demonstrate how a cyber-attack can covertly have physical 
effects on protected hardware. Stuxnet was a malicious computer worm launched in 2010 
that destroyed nearly one-fifth of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges (Cyber Security Forum 
Initiative [CSFI], 2010). The computer worm specifically targeted the supervisory control 
and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, which allowed the attacker to access the 
programmable logic controllers (PLCs) that controlled the centrifuges. The worm’s 
malware then modified the industrial controllers, causing the centrifuges to spin so fast that 
they broke. The malware was also designed to make the centrifuge’s computer monitors 
appear as if everything were operating normally so that the plant operators remained in the 
dark. The worm was self-replicating and infected over 200,000 computers in the process 
of reaching the Iranian nuclear plant (CSFI, 2010). While the cyber weapon is believed to 
have been developed by the United States and Israel, both nations continue to deny their 
involvement.  
While it is true that cyber-attacks have historically been focused on information 
technology systems and have had limited physical effects, the possibility of a cyber-attack 
on a combat aircraft’s software or hardware should not be dismissed. Just like the Stuxnet 
worm targeted a specific piece of hardware, adversaries may be able to target specific 
aircraft cyber-systems if those systems are not well protected.  
The rapid evolution of cyber conflict and the current global landscape suggest that 
cyber is a real and growing threat that should not be ignored. While no aircraft has been 
successfully hit by a cyber-attack (any cyber incident with a cyber-attack would likely be 
highly classified), the possibility that such an attack is possible should be taken seriously 
and combat platforms should be designed with cyber survivability in mind. There is a need 
to expand the current ACS design discipline to include the emerging cyber threat to combat 
aircraft. The survivability design discipline needs to evolve as the threats that combat 
aircraft face evolve. 
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II. OVERVIEW OF AIRCRAFT COMBAT SURVIVABILITY 
DESIGN DISCIPLINE  
A. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF AIRCRAFT COMBAT SURVIVABILITY  
Aircraft combat survivability (ACS), as defined by Dr. Robert Ball in his textbook 
The Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability Analysis and Design (2003), is “the 
capability of an aircraft to avoid or withstand a man-made hostile environment (MMHE)” 
(p. 1). The survivability of an aircraft is a function of its susceptibility and vulnerability. 
In the ACS discipline, susceptibility is defined as the inability of an aircraft to avoid the 
threat elements of the MMHE (Ball, 2003). These elements include the guns, missiles, 
exploding warheads, air interceptors, lasers, radars, and all other elements associated with 
an enemy’s air defense. The more likely a combat aircraft is to be hit by a weapon, the 
more susceptible the aircraft is. The active threat’s characteristics, the aircraft’s detectable 
signatures, the defense countermeasures, the aircraft and crew performance, and the 
combat scenario will influence the susceptibility of an aircraft. 
Vulnerability is defined as the inability of an aircraft to withstand the damage 
caused by the threat elements of the MMHE (Ball, 2003). The more likely that a hit results 
in an aircraft kill, the more vulnerable the aircraft is. The types of damage-causing 
mechanisms, the number of warheads that hit the aircraft, the design of the aircraft, and the 
location and number of critical components on an aircraft influence the aircraft’s 
vulnerability. Dr. Ball describes critical components as the parts of an aircraft that are either 
mission-essential or flight-essential (Ball, 2003). Killing a critical component will 
ultimately result in an aircraft kill. Aircraft are vulnerable because their critical components 
are vulnerable (Adams, 2019a). The goal of the ACS discipline is to enhance the 
survivability of combat aircraft by reducing its susceptibility and vulnerability. 
Susceptibility reduction and vulnerability reduction concepts for KEWs are discussed later 
in this chapter. 
 The opposite of survivability is killability. In ACS, killability is the ease at which 
an aircraft is killed and is the product of susceptibility and vulnerability (Ball, 2003). The 
survivability of an aircraft is enhanced when the killability is reduced. Killability is reduced 
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when susceptibility or vulnerability are reduced. In ACS, an aircraft kill can result from 
either the physical loss of an aircraft (attrition kill) or if that aircraft, due to the loss of 
critical components, is unable to perform its mission (mission kill). Both flight essential 
functions, functions needed to sustain controlled flight like lift, thrust, control, and 
structural integrity, and mission essential functions, functions needed to successfully carry 
out the intended mission, are important to protect in a MMHE. An enemy’s attack is 
successful if it can take a target aircraft either out of flight or out of the fight.  
 The type and extent of damage done on an aircraft from an enemy warhead depends 
on the KEW’s damage mechanisms. In ACS, a warhead’s damage mechanism is the 
“physical entity that causes damage to the aircraft” (Ball, 2003, p. 280). The damage 
mechanisms for high explosive warheads and penetrator type weapons are typically 
metallic penetrators and fragments, incendiary materials, and blasts. Warheads can, and 
often do, utilize more than one damage mechanism. Dr. Ball uses the term damage process 
to describe how the damage mechanisms and the aircraft’s physical components interact 
(2003). In ACS, the terminal effect refers to the physical damage state of an aircraft’s 
components affected by the damage process (Adams, 2019b). Another important and useful 
term for defining how damage mechanisms may lead to an aircraft kill is kill mode. If an 
enemy warhead hits an aircraft, the kill mode describes the physical response of the 
aircraft’s components that result in those components becoming inoperable (Ball, 2003). If 
the killed component happens to be a critical component, the component kill will result in 
an aircraft kill due to the loss of an essential function.  
To clarify the differences between the terms damage mechanism, damage process, 
terminal effect, and kill mode, let us consider a scenario in which an incendiary round hits 
a wing’s fuel tank. The damage mechanism in this scenario would be the incendiary 
material in the round. The damage process would be the physical combustion in the wing’s 
fuel tank. The terminal effect would be the large hole in the wing’s skin that resulted from 
the hit. Finally, the kill mode would be the in-tank explosion that rendered the control 
surfaces of the wing inoperable.  
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B. HOW SURVIVABILITY IS MEASURED: THE PROBABILISTIC KILL 
CHAIN 
In combat, nothing is known with certainty. For any mission scenario, many 
random variables will ultimately determine the mission’s outcome. Aircraft survivability 
is measured using probabilities because of these uncertainties. In ACS, the probability that 
an aircraft survives an encounter is denoted as 𝑃𝑆 (Ball, 2003). The complement to an 
aircraft’s probability of survival is its probability of being killed, denoted as 𝑃𝐾. These 
probabilities range from 0 to 1 and are mutually exclusive and exhaustive outcomes. Either 
the aircraft survives the encounter or the aircraft is killed; the two probabilities must add 
to one (Equation 1). 
𝑃𝑆 = 1 − 𝑃𝐾         (1) 
An aircraft’s killability, the ease at which an aircraft is killed, is a product of an 
aircraft’s susceptibility and vulnerability (Adams, 2019a). For an engagement level 
assessment (that is one weapon versus one aircraft), an aircraft’s susceptibility can be 
broken down into five sequential, mutually exclusive events. For an aircraft to be hit by a 
KEW, the weapon must perform the following phases in order: 1) the weapon system must 
be active, 2) the weapon system must detect the aircraft, 3) the weapon must be launched 
at the aircraft, 4) the weapon must intercept the aircraft, and 5) the weapon’s damage 
mechanisms must hit the aircraft, either by direct hit or proximity fusing (Ball, 2003). For 
an aircraft to be killed by a KEW, the hit must result in the loss of a critical component and 
therefore a loss of either a flight or mission essential function. This last part makes up the 
aircraft’s vulnerability section.  
The major phases of a kinetic attack and their respective probabilistic outcomes can 
be represented using a simple tree diagram. The probabilistic kill chain shown below is 
used in ACS to describe the structure of a kinetic attack and for calculating survivability 
and killability for a one-on-one engagement (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. ACS probabilistic kill chain. Source: Ball (2003). 
The numbers in parenthesis represent each of the six phases necessary for an aircraft 
kill. Each phase is binary and results in either a successful outcome or an unsuccessful 
outcome. There are two complementary probabilities for each phase of the kill chain. 𝑃𝑥 
represents the probability that a particular phase will be successful. 𝑃𝑐𝑥 represents the 
probability that a particular phase will be unsuccessful. Conditional probabilities are used 
after the first phase to represent the likelihood of outcomes given that the previous phases 
were successful. Conditional probabilities allow us to view each phase as an independent 
event. 𝑃𝑥|𝑦 represents the likelihood of phase ‘x’ occurring given that phase ‘y’ (the 
previous phase) was successful. Ball defines the six successful conditional phase 




1. 𝑃𝐴 is the probability that a threat weapon on the vicinity of the aircraft is 
active, that is, the weapon is searching, actively or passively, and ready 
to encounter and engage aircraft flying within its defined area. 
2. 𝑃𝐷|𝐴 is the conditional probability that the aircraft is detected, given that 
the threat is active. 
3. 𝑃𝐿|𝐷 is the conditional probability that the aircraft is tracked, a fire 
control solution is obtained, and a missile is launched or a gun is fired at 
the aircraft, given that the threat was active and detected the aircraft. 
4. 𝑃𝐼|𝐿 is the conditional probability that the threat propagator approaches 
or intercepts the aircraft, given that the propagator was launched or fired 
at the aircraft. 
5. 𝑃𝐻|𝐼 is the conditional probability that the propagator hits the aircraft, 
given that the propagator has intercepted the aircraft. 
6. 𝑃𝐾|𝐻  is the conditional probability that the aircraft is killed, given a direct 
hit by the propagator. (Ball, 2003, p. 12) 
Each path of one or more sequential branches is called an event (Ball, 2003). The 
likelihood of a particular event occurring can be calculated by multiplying each subsequent 
branch together. For example, the probability of the weapon launching but not intercepting 
the aircraft (an event) would be: 𝑃𝐴 × 𝑃𝐷|𝐴 × 𝑃𝐿|𝐷 × 𝑃
𝑐
𝐼|𝐿.  
From the attacker’s point of view, for an encounter to result in an aircraft kill, each 
of the subsequent phases must have successful outcomes. An aircraft’s susceptibility to a 
KEW, 𝑃𝐻,  is measured by the probability that an aircraft is hit during an engagement 
(Equation 2).  
𝑃𝐻 = 𝑃𝐴 × 𝑃𝐷|𝐴 × 𝑃𝐿|𝐷 × 𝑃𝐼|𝐿 × 𝑃𝐻|𝐼        (2) 
An aircraft’s vulnerability, 𝑃𝐾|𝐻, is measured by the conditional probability that an 
aircraft is killed given a hit. Killability, as defined earlier, is the product of susceptibility 
and vulnerability. Killability is therefore the product of all of the successful phase 
probabilities listed above (Equation 3). 
𝑃𝐾 = 𝑃𝐻 × 𝑃𝐾|𝐻 = 𝑃𝐴 × 𝑃𝐷|𝐴 × 𝑃𝐿|𝐷 × 𝑃𝐼|𝐿 × 𝑃𝐻|𝐼 × 𝑃𝐾|𝐻        (3) 
If any phase results in an unsuccessful outcome, the chain is broken and the aircraft 
survives. An aircraft’s survivability during a one-on-one engagement can be calculated by 
subtracting the probability of kill from one (Equation 1). Therefore, to enhance an aircraft’s 
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survivability, one must reduce an aircraft’s susceptibility or vulnerability by decreasing the 
likelihood that one or more of these six events is successful. 
C. SURVIVABILITY ENHANCEMENT 
Survivability, as defined earlier, is the ability of an aircraft to avoid or withstand an 
MMHE (Ball, 2003). Therefore, the survivability of an aircraft can be improved by either 
making the aircraft more capable of avoiding threats present in the MMHE or making the 
aircraft more capable of withstanding damage caused by threats present in the MMHE. In 
other words, survivability can be enhanced by either reducing an aircraft’s susceptibility 
(the inability to avoid damage) or by reducing an aircraft’s vulnerability (the inability to 
withstand damage).  
A survivability enhancement feature is defined by Dr. Ball (2003) as “any particular 
characteristic of the aircraft, specific piece of equipment, design technique, armament, or 
tactic that reduces either the susceptibility or the vulnerability of the aircraft” (p. 34). From 
the ACS probabilistic kill chain (Figure 2), an aircraft kill results only if all six events 
successfully occur. The purpose of survivability enhancement is to increase the likelihood 
that the sequence of events is broken at some point along the kill chain. The current ACS 
design discipline created by Ball (2003) lays out twelve general concepts that are 
fundamental to survivability enhancement. The survivability enhancement concepts 
summarized below function as tools for program managers and engineers as they design 
and build survivable combat platforms. These concepts focus primarily on KEWs. 
1. Susceptibility Reduction 
The first six survivability enhancement concepts focus on reducing an aircraft’s 
susceptibility. The susceptibility reduction concepts are designed to reduce the likelihood 
that an aircraft is hit in combat. 
a. Situational Awareness 
The purpose of the situational awareness concept is to provide information to the 
pilot and crew about the location, type, and status of the kinetic threat elements near the 
aircraft (Ball, 2003). Warning the pilot of an imminent threat gives the pilot a chance to 
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respond with a course of action that minimizes the likelihood that the KEW successfully 
hits the aircraft. The use of radar warning receivers or missile launch and approach warning 
systems are examples of reducing susceptibility via situational awareness. 
b. Signature Reduction and Control 
The purpose of the signature reduction and control concept is to reduce how 
observable an aircraft is to an adversary or an adversary’s weapon system (Ball, 2003). For 
a guided missile to successfully hit its target, it must be able to detect and track the position 
of the target using sensors. Reducing the radar, infrared (IR), ultraviolet (UV), acoustic, 
visual, or magnetic signature of an aircraft below the weapon system sensor’s threshold 
reduces susceptibility by decreasing the likelihood that the threat can successfully detect 
and intercept the aircraft. For example, stealth aircraft use the signature reduction concept 
by minimizing its radar cross-section to avoid detection from anti-aircraft weapon systems.  
c. Noise Jamming and Deceiving 
The purpose of the noise jamming and deceiving concept is to degrade the 
effectiveness of various threat elements by interfering with their electronic signals (Ball, 
2003). Noise jamming utilizes active electronic equipment that radiates a concentrated 
signal toward an enemy’s detection and tracking equipment. Noise jamming interferes with 
and blocks the signal received by an enemy’s weapon system. Noise jamming reduces 
susceptibility by reducing the likelihood of successful detection. The objective of deception 
is to transmit signals designed to confuse or mislead an enemy’s weapon system. 
Susceptibility can be reduced by using deceptive signals to appear as a large number of 
false targets or as a target with incorrect bearing, range, or velocity information.  
d. Expendables 
The purpose of the expendables concept is to eject materials or devises from an 
aircraft to divert a KEW’s tracking system (Ball, 2003). Expendables can be used for self-
protection or for mutual support between multiple aircraft. Examples of expendables 
include chaff, retroreflectors, flares, and aerosols. Chaff and retroreflectors are effective 
against radar-guided missiles, flares are effective against IR-guided systems, and aerosol 
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is effective against visually-directed or IR-guided missiles. Expendables reduce 
susceptibility by decreasing the likelihood that a weapon successfully intercepts the aircraft 
by confusing and diverting anti-aircraft missiles. 
e. Threat Suppression 
The purpose of the threat suppression concept is to physically damage, destroy, or 
deny the use of an enemy’s air defense system (Ball, 2003). Threat suppression can be done 
by supporting aircraft, ground elements, or by the target aircraft. While physically 
destroying an enemy’s air defense is obviously an extremely effective strategy for 
enhancing survivability, effective susceptibility reduction can also be accomplished via 
deterrence. For example, the presence of a fighter escort might discourage an adversary 
from launching their anti-aircraft missiles for fear that the fighter escort might fire back. 
Threat suppression effectively reduces susceptibility by destroying or damaging the threat 
before the threat can destroy or damage the target aircraft. 
f. Weapons and Tactics, Flight Performance, and Crew Training and 
Proficiency 
The last susceptibility reduction concept combines personnel and platform 
performance (Ball, 2003). The weapons onboard a combat aircraft greatly affect the 
aircraft’s survivability. For example, a shooter aircraft fitted with JASSMs (Joint Air-to-
Surface Standoff Missile) that can be fired from over 200 miles away would have a much 
higher likelihood of survival than a shooter aircraft fitted with only JDAMs (Joint Direct 
Attack Munitions), which have a maximum range of only 15 miles. Susceptibility is 
reduced if the aircraft’s weapons can be launched outside of the range of enemy air-
defenses.  
The combat tactics are also important for determining the survivability of an aircraft 
during a given mission. Survivability will change depending on how many aircraft are used 
for a mission and the amount of air and ground support they receive. Generally, greater 
aerodynamic performance is preferred for survivable fighter aircraft, but it is important to 
consider the design trade-offs (i.e., stealth versus agility) required to design faster, more 
maneuverable aircraft. Finally, a large part of reducing susceptibility is left to the training 
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and proficiency of the crew operating and maintaining the aircraft. A more proficient 
aircrew will undoubtedly have a higher likelihood of survival than a poorly trained or 
inexperienced aircrew.  
2. Vulnerability Reduction 
The final six survivability enhancement concepts focus on reducing an aircraft’s 
vulnerability. The vulnerability reduction concepts are designed to reduce the likelihood 
that an aircraft hit by a KEW is killed. 
a. Component Redundancy (with Physical Separation) 
The purpose of the component redundancy concept is to have multiple parts, 
systems, or mechanisms in place that can each perform the same function in the event that 
the main component is rendered inoperable (Ball, 2003). For example, if the only engine 
of a single-engine aircraft is killed, the hit will likely result in an aircraft kill. However, if 
only one of two engines is hit, the aircraft will likely be able to withstand the damage and 
continue flying using its working engine. However, if the two engines are right next to each 
other (without physical separation), one hit may kill both engines. Physical separation is 
critical for component redundancy. Backing up critical components with physically 
separated redundant components reduces vulnerability by reducing the likelihood that a 
single hit results in the loss of essential functions. 
b. Component Location 
The purpose of the component location concept is to position critical components 
in a manner that reduces the likelihood that a single hit will result in the kill of that critical 
component (Ball, 2003). This can be done multiple ways. Positioning non-critical 
components in front of critical components reduces the likelihood that a damage 
mechanism will produce lethal damage to the critical component. The orientation of critical 
components can also reduce vulnerability by minimizing the component’s presented area. 
The vulnerable area (and therefore the vulnerability) can also be reduced by overlapping 
critical components.  
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c. Component Elimination or Replacement 
The purpose of the component elimination or replacement concept is to reduce 
aircraft vulnerability by either getting rid of a critical component or substituting a critical 
component with a less vulnerable component that serves the same function (Ball, 2003). 
For example, UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) reduce vulnerability by eliminating the 
need for onboard life-supporting equipment. Alternatively, replacing a large critical 
component with a smaller component with the same functionality reduces vulnerability by 
reducing the presented surface area of that critical component. It is important to note that 
replacing a component may introduce new kill modes associated with the new component. 
These new potential kill modes must be taken into account when designing aircraft for 
survivability. 
d. Component Shielding 
The purpose of the component shielding concept is to reduce aircraft vulnerability 
by using coatings or plating to shield critical components from damage mechanisms (Ball, 
2003). Strong, armored material can resist or absorb kinetic damage effects so that the 
critical components behind them can still function if an aircraft is hit by a KEW. For 
example, a blast or fragment shield in the cockpit reduces vulnerability by reducing the 
likelihood that an explosion from an anti-aircraft warhead kills or injures the pilot and/or 
crew. An important distinction is necessary to differentiate the component shielding and 
component location concepts. The component shielding concept is used when coatings or 
armored plates are added to a design. The component location concept is used when critical 
components are positioned behind non-critical components.  
e. Damage Suppression 
The purpose of the damage suppression concept is to reduce vulnerability by 
containing damage caused by a damage mechanism or reduce the effects of that damage 
(Ball, 2003). Damage suppression can be either active (requiring damage-sensing 
capability) or passive in nature. Damage tolerance and ballistic resistance are just two 
passive ways of suppressing damage to reduce the effects of damage. An override switch 
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that, after detecting damage to a certain system, allows a pilot to disengage the damaged 
system is an example of active damage suppression. Damage suppression techniques 
reduce vulnerability by decreasing the likelihood that the damage caused by a damage 
mechanism will ultimately result in an aircraft kill. 
f. Recovery 
The purpose of the recovery concept is to disengage damaged or disabled 
components and return the aircraft to responsive control or, if recovering full flight control 
is not possible, to safely land the aircraft to be repaired by a ground maintenance crew. The 
ability to recover an aircraft is dependent on both the training of the aircrew operating the 
aircraft and the engineering design of the aircraft itself. For example, if a KEW were to hit 
and kill the port engine of an F-18, the pilot may still be able to recover the aircraft by 
disengaging the damaged engine to return the aircraft to responsive control using only the 
starboard engine. Aircraft recovery almost always requires knowledge of the location and 
extent of damage. Therefore, for successful recovery, it is imperative that operators have 
strong situational awareness of existing threats and threat effects. If full recovery of 
mission essential functions is not possible, recovering the physical aircraft via a forced 
landing, while still resulting in a mission kill, is far better than losing the aircraft and its 
crew. 
D. WHY DO WE NEED AIRCRAFT COMBAT SURVIVABILITY? 
The DoD mandates that air combat programs conduct thorough survivability 
assessments for good reason (DoD, 2018b). The goal of survivability enhancement is to 
improve the aircraft’s overall cost effectiveness as a warfighting platform (Ball, 2003). 
While designing for survivability may increase the initial development and production 
costs, designing aircraft that are more capable of achieving mission objectives in high-risk 
combat scenarios and returning home safely will ultimately decrease the lifecycle cost of 
the program (Adams, 2019a).  
History has shown that platforms not designed to survive in their hostile operating 
environments are less effective at carrying out sustained air operations (Ball, 2003). 
Survivability, therefore, has a direct impact on our nation’s ability to save lives in combat 
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and win wars decisively. Historically, when aircraft are designed to be survivable, “fewer 
wars are fought, more missions are accomplished, more battles are won, and more lives are 
saved” (Ball, 2003). Figure 3 shows historical combat aircraft loss rates throughout the 
twentieth century. 
 
Figure 3. Historical losses and loss rates. Source: Ball (2003). 
Since the 1970s, when the ACS design discipline was formally introduced, combat loss 
rates have decreased significantly. The focus on survivability over the last fifty years has 
saved countless lives and although current combat loss rates continue to remain low, the 
hostile environments in which our aircraft operate are dynamic and always changing. 
Kinetic air-defense systems continue to evolve and new anti-aircraft threats are beginning 
to emerge. The survivability of aircraft must continue to improve today to face the 
increasingly sophisticated and lethal anti-aircraft threats of tomorrow.  
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E. THREATS TO COMBAT AIRCRAFT 
Aircraft combat survivability is needed because combat aircraft operate in hostile 
environments full of lethal threats. Just how much survivability is needed depends on the 
types of threats expected in the operating environment and the estimated effectiveness of 
those threats (Ball, 2003). Threats to aircraft can be broken down into four categories: 
kinetic energy weapons, electromagnetic (EM) weapons, unconventional weapons, and 
cyber weapons (Figure 4). While KEWs have historically been the largest threat to combat 
aircraft, other threats exist and should not be ignored. Today’s combat platforms are 
expected to operate effectively for decades. It is therefore critical that systems are designed 
not just to survive in the current warfighting environment, but in the projected warfighting 
environment of the future, when electronic warfare, unconventional, and cyber threats 
might play a larger role in armed conflicts. Dr. Ball’s textbook on ACS, published in 2003, 
has no mention of cyber threats. The global risk landscape has changed dramatically since 
2003. Cyber threats were not even included in the World Economic Forum’s global risk 
report until 2010 (World Economic Forum [WEF], 2010). Now, cyber-attacks are listed as 
one of the top five risks in both likelihood and impact (WEF, 2019). 
 
Figure 4. Categorizing threats 
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1. Kinetic Energy Weapons 
Kinetic energy weapons (KEW) include the guns, missiles, and rocket-powered 
grenades (RPGs) traditionally used for air-defense. Anti-aircraft guns are devices that 
propel rounds, projectiles, or shells via an explosive force. Guns range from 20 mm, hand-
held small arms to over 100 mm, target tracking antiaircraft heavy artillery. Missiles are 
self-propelled weapons that typically contain a propulsion system, guidance system, 
tracking sensors, and high-explosive warhead. These weapons are referred to as kinetic 
energy weapons because the damage mechanisms associated with their warheads rely on 
kinetic energy (Ball & Bryant, 2020a). The damage mechanisms associated with KEWs 
typically include metallic penetrators, armor-piercing ballistic penetrators (AP), armor-
piercing ballistic penetrators with incendiaries (AP-I), high-velocity fragments, and blasts.  
KEWs are the most common threat to combat aircraft. These weapons can be either 
guided or unguided and can operate independently, in small groups, or as part of a large 
integrated air-defense system (IADS) (Ball, 2003). KEWs can be fired from stationary or 
mobile surface-based platforms or airborne platforms. This includes air-to-air missiles, 
such as the infrared-guided AIM-9 Sidewinder, surface-to-air guns, such as the Phalanx 
close-in weapon system (CIWS), and surface-to-air missiles, such as the land-based MIM-
104 Patriot. Dr. Ball’s ACS textbook focuses primarily on these KEWs (Ball, 2003).  
2. Electronic Warfare Weapons 
The DoD defines electronic warfare as any “military action involving the use of 
electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack 
the enemy” (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2020, p. 71). The weapons used to conduct 
electronic warfare can be divided into two categories: traditional electromagnetic weapons 
and directed energy weapons.  
Traditional electromagnetic weapons include jammers and anti-radiation missiles. 
Jammers are devices that generate EM energy to blind radars with high-power noise or 
hide the location of a target by generating false radar targets (LaMarche, 2018). Anti-
radiation missiles are missiles designed to seek and destroy an adversary’s radar, radio, or 
communication signals. The damage mechanism associated with traditional 
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electromagnetic weapons is EM radiation. Traditional electromagnetic weapons are 
primarily used to disrupt or deny an adversary’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum 
(EMS). 
Directed energy weapons use beams of concentrated EM energy or subatomic 
particles to incapacitate, damage, or destroy target platforms, facilities, or personnel (JCS, 
2020). This category of weapons includes neutral or charged particle beams, high-energy 
lasers, and high-power radio-frequency/microwave (HPM) weapons. Particle beam 
weapons, as the name suggests, use high-energy beams of atomic or subatomic particles to 
affect a target’s atomic or molecular structure. These particles can be launched at near light-
speed and can cause instantaneous superheating and ionization. Lasers (light amplification 
by stimulated emission of radiation) are devices that emit and direct highly concentrated 
light through optical amplification. While low-energy level lasers are typically used for 
weapon guidance, high-energy lasers may be used to take down drones or manned aircraft 
(Ball, 2003). High-power radio-frequency/microwave weapons are EM sources that direct 
intense radio-frequency/microwave energy to produce temporary or permanent damage to 
electronic systems (Tatum, 2019). HPMs can engage multiple targets at speeds near the 
speed of light, can produce scalable effects with unlimited low-cost ammo, and is non-
lethal to humans. While most large-scale directed energy weapons are still in the 
developmental stage, the scientific theories behind these weapons are sound and 
experiments backed by decades of research continue to show that direct energy weapons 
are plausibility, if not probable. 
3. Unconventional Weapons 
Unconventional weapons include nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. An 
important distinction between unconventional and conventional weapons is their scope of 
lethality. Where-as kinetic energy and electromagnetic weapons are likely to attack single 
platforms or weapon systems, unconventional weapons are capable of killing many targets 
or causing mass casualties (Ball, 2003). Unconventional weapons are often referred to as 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their use in armed conflict is illegal.  
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Nuclear weapons are explosive devices that release extremely high amounts of 
energy using nuclear fission and/or fusion processes. The primary damage mechanisms 
associated with nuclear weapons are thermal radiation, nuclear radiation, and blast waves 
(Ball, 2003). Chemical weapons are munitions that release chemical substances designed 
to kill, injure, incapacitate, or irritate. Chemical weapons can be categorized by their 
physiological damage mechanisms and include nerve agents, blister agents, choking 
agents, and blood agents. Biological weapons release viruses, bacteria, or other toxic 
microorganisms to cause material deterioration or death and disease in humans, plants, and 
animals (World Health Organization, 2020). Biological weapons typically contain 
pathogens (living organisms that cause disease and are capable of multiplying and 
spreading) or toxins (highly poisonous substances produced by living organisms). Because 
of the distinct differences between unconventional and kinetic energy weapons, an entirely 
separate nuclear, biological, and chemical survivability discipline has evolved apart from 
ACS (Ball, 2003).  
4. Cyber Weapons 
A cyber weapon is any piece of malware employed by a state or non-state actor 
intended to degrade, disrupt, destroy, or deny operations in cyberspace. The cyber domain 
is made up of millions of lines of code and data that control information technologies, 
computer systems, processors, industrial controllers, and communication networks. While 
cyber weapons can cause physical damage to cyber systems and hardware, attacks in the 
cyber domain typically result in functional damage or dysfunctions. A cyber weapon’s 
dysfunction mechanism is the malicious computer code that causes the loss or degradation 
of system capabilities (Ball & Bryant, 2020a). Unlike other threats, cyber weapons are 
almost entirely virtual, but their effects are still felt in the real world. Cyber weapons can 
be launched instantaneously from anywhere in the world and the covert nature of cyber-
attacks makes attribution incredibly difficult.  
While kinetic energy weapons continue to be the leading threat to combat aircraft, 
emerging threats in cyber are growing fast. The rest of this thesis will discuss the cyber 
threat in more depth and offer guidance for designing cyber-survivable combat aircraft. 
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III. A NEW THREAT IN CYBER 
A. FUNDAMENTALS OF CYBER 
Many members of the DoD have heard of “cyber,” but few are fully aware of the 
extent to which cyberspace is foundational to military operations and of the increasing 
threat levels associated with it. Before attempting to solve the issue of enhancing the cyber 
combat survivability of aircraft platforms and weapon systems, it is necessary to lay some 
groundwork about what cyber defense is and what DoD systems are at risk of a cyber-
attack.  
1. Cyberspace and Cybersecurity 
Cyberspace, as defined by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (2014), is “a 
global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent 
network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, 
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 
controllers.” Two important take-aways need to be highlighted from this definition. The 
first is that cyberspace, and therefore a cyber-attack, is not limited to computers and the 
Internet. Any piece of hardware that communicates remotely with another piece of 
hardware is a part of cyberspace and therefore has cyber vulnerabilities. Any processor, 
controller, or avionics computer is a part of the cyber-domain. The first important take-
away leads to the second important take-away. Nearly all mission platforms, weapon 
systems, and day-to-day logistics and operations used by our armed forces are heavily 
reliant on cyberspace operations. 
Cybersecurity is the capability to restore and/or prevent dysfunctions to those 
components that comprise cyberspace, including computers, electronic communications 
systems, and the information contained therein. The Department of the Navy (2020, para. 
1) defines cybersecurity as the “prevention of damage to, protection of, and restoration of 
computers, electronic communications systems, electronic communications services, wire 
communication, and electronic communication, including information contained therein, 
to ensure its availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation.” 
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Our military has become increasingly reliant on systems that operate in cyberspace and 
some of the information contained within those systems is highly sensitive. It is therefore 
imperative that all of our military’s cyber systems are secure and well protected. 
While the importance of cybersecurity is clear, it is naive to think that our systems 
are entirely safe from all attempted cyber-attacks, even with the most advanced, modern 
cybersecurity strategies (Bryant, 2016). Cyberspace operates through millions of lines of 
code. Advanced nation-state level adversaries have and will continue to look for the 
smallest chink in our armor and exploit that vulnerability. This is why it is so important to 
anticipate and prepare for successful cyber-attacks and ensure that the successful 
implementation and triggering of malware does not take the attacked system or platform 
out of the fight. 
2. Categorizing DoD Cyber Systems 
As previously mentioned, a majority of military operations are heavily dependent 
on systems that operate in cyberspace. Most service members are familiar with information 
technology (IT) systems and understand how those systems might be vulnerable to cyber-
based attacks. These systems, however, makeup only one category of cyber systems that 
are vulnerable to cyber threats. While IT systems have generally been the most targeted 
systems, operational technology (OT), and weapon platforms are also vulnerable to cyber 
threats and should not be overlooked. 
a. Information Technology Systems 
The first category of cyber systems is traditional IT systems (Bryant, 2018b). IT 
systems consist of all of the command and control centers used by our military. This 
includes the Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router network (NIPRNET), Secure Internet 
Protocol Router network (SIPRNET), and other weapon systems, logistics systems, and 
personnel networks. The goal of most cyber-attacks against IT systems is to introduce a 
small amount of false information that, as a result, makes us question all of the information 
on our systems. This seemingly harmless, small attack has massive ramifications on the 
readiness and warfighting capabilities of our forces. Just a small amount of doubt in these 
27 
mission critical systems can render units unable to carry out mission objectives until the 
small amount of disguised, false information is found. 
b. Operational Technology Systems 
Operational technologies makes up the second category of cyber systems used by 
our Department of Defense (Bryant, 2018b). Operational technology refers to the 
computer-controlled systems that are necessary for everyday operations such as heating 
and air-conditioning systems. While these systems are not normally considered as potential 
targets for cyber-attacks, it has become a growing concern in recent years thanks to a 
myriad of successful cyber-attacks launched against private banks and major corporations. 
Imagine a scenario in which an attacker is able to disable a building’s air conditioning in 
the middle of summer. Now imagine if that building is not just any building, but the 
cryptologic headquarters of tenth fleet, whose computers can no longer run because of the 
extreme high temperatures. Unfortunately, compared to IT systems, OT systems are largely 
unprotected and not designed to defend against harmful cyber-attacks because they were 
not designed with cyber threats in mind. 
c. Combat Platforms/Weapons Systems 
The last category of cyber systems is made up of the combat platforms and weapons 
systems themselves. These systems are normally thought to be “air-gapped,” or standalone 
systems that are not directly connected to other networks or the internet (Bryant, 2019). 
This way of thinking leads many to believe that these systems are not vulnerable to cyber 
threats. This way of thinking is overly optimistic. These systems have to be routinely 
connected to maintenance devices for updates and patches, exposing these systems to the 
larger cyberspace universe and thus to cyber-attacks.  
Cybersecurity of IT and OT systems is already widely discussed in literature, and 
traditional defenses can be put in place to protect these systems from cyber-attacks. The 
focus of this paper is to address the protection and survival of the third, less discussed 
category of DoD cyber systems, combat platforms/weapons systems, using the same 
fundamentals that Dr. Ball lays out in the ACS design discipline.  
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B. PROSPECT OF CYBER AS AN ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPON 
The prospect of using a cyber-weapon to attack an aircraft is an idea that is just now 
beginning to be researched by the aircraft survivability community (Bryant, 2019). 
Traditionally, cyber-attacks have been almost solely on IT networks and very few of those 
attempted have had lasting physical effects. Decision-makers still do not fully understand 
the scope of cyber operations and the potential that the cyber domain will offer adversaries 
over the next decades. There has been a false assumption that because combat aircraft are 
“air gapped” or not directly connected to the internet, they are immune to cyber-based 
attacks. But, as previously discussed, cyber involves more than just the internet.  
The cyber domain includes “the internet of networked computers but also intranets, 
cellular technologies, fiber-optic cables, and space-based communications” (Nye, 2011, p. 
19). This means that cyber-attacks are not limited to computers and the Internet. Any piece 
of hardware that communicates remotely with another piece of hardware is a part of 
cyberspace and therefore has cyber vulnerabilities. Any processor, controller, or avionics 
computer is a part of the cyber-domain and is a potential target for a cyber-attack. 
Today’s combat aircraft have a very large attack surface (Bryant, 2018a). Mission 
planning computers, data transfer devices, maintenance systems, smart weapons, pods, and 
components of software development are all physically connected to the aircraft and 
operate in cyberspace (Bryant & Young, 2019). Additionally, datalinks, GPS, SATCOM, 
radio communication, and even radar components operate in the cyber sphere through the 
electromagnetic spectrum and may be susceptible to a potential cyber-attack (Bryant & 
Young, 2019). Access to any one of these systems could put a combat aircraft and its 
mission in jeopardy. A cyber-attack on any of these cyber-physical systems could spread 
to other cyber components and cause dysfunctions that result in the loss or degradation of 
flight and/or mission essential functions. 
To access these systems, all an adversary would have to do is find an insider or wait 
for an exploitable maintenance update of a “standalone” aircraft system (Bryant, 2019). 
Insider threats have been and continue to be a massive problem in our armed forces. The 
ease at which an insider threat could access an aircraft’s cyber-systems is higher than many 
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would like to admit and the possibility of accessing and implanting malicious code on an 
aircraft’s systems is not as farfetched as one might think. There have been several examples 
of either successful cyber-attacks or investigative studies done on the defenselessness of 
automobiles and other “air gapped” platforms to cyber threats (Anderson et al., 2011). The 
Iranian nuclear plant that the Stuxnet worm targeted was one very well protected, yet an 
attacker was able to successfully access the SCADA system and implant malware that 
caused significant physical damage. Theoretically, the same could be done to an aircraft. 
To make matters worse, the potential damage that the cyber threat brings to the 
table is only starting to be realized. Cyber operations have been getting more creative, more 
sophisticated, more impactful, and more covert. To nation-states that may not have had the 
physical resources to compete with the militaries of world superpowers, cyber offers a 
chance for them to punch above their weight. For our adversaries who already have a strong 
cyber presence like China, Russia, and Iran, cyber armies backed by nation-state resources 
provide a new, powerful means of damaging U.S. military assets covertly. Undoubtedly, 
the U.S. is not the only power pouring time and money into defending and attacking cyber-
systems. The scope to which cyber-attacks might manifest themselves will likely only 
grow.  
C. APPEAL AND IMPACT OF CYBERWARFARE 
There are many reasons why nation-states would want to use cyber to conduct 
offensive operations against combat platforms. Sandro Gaycken (2011, p. 79), a 
cybersecurity expert and advisor to NATO, advocates, “states take cyber warfare seriously 
as they are viewed as an attractive activity by many nations, in times of war and peace. 
Offensive cyber operations offer a large variety of cheap and risk-free options to weaken 
other countries and strengthen their own positions.” Gaycken adds that offensive cyber 
operations have high potential to agitate military conflict and reduce military capabilities. 
General Keith Alexander, the first USCYBERCOM commander, listed air defense 
networks and combat weapon systems as potential targets that could be attacked by a cyber-
weapon (Shanker, 2010). 
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Offensive cyber operations are appealing because of the distributed nature of cyber-
based attacks. This is one reason why cyber operations have been evolving so rapidly. In 
the cyber domain, determining the attacking party and the motivation behind the attack is 
often quite challenging (Ragan, 2010). This makes it increasingly difficult to determine 
whether a serious cyber-attack is an act of war or not. It is in this gray area between peace 
and war that cyber warfare operates and thrives in.  
To adversaries, cyber provides a powerful platform for causing major disruptions 
with little to no consequences. It is difficult for a victim of a cyber-attack to respond to an 
attack if the attacker can easily deny their involvement. This is one of the major motivators 
for choosing cyber over kinetic operations. There is less need to launch a physical attack if 
the same outcome can result from a cyber-based attack. As Arquilla and Ronfeldt put it, 
“we’re no longer just hurling mass and energy at our opponents in warfare; now we’re 
using information, and the more you have, the less of the older kind of weapons you need” 
(Duggan, 2015, p. 47).  
Cyber is also an appealing weapon because it has potential to pack a large punch at 
a relatively low cost and with low personal risk. Sophisticated yet inexpensive technologies 
make it increasingly easier for adversaries to develop substantial offensive capabilities. 
The low relative cost of developing a cyber-weapon is another big reason why 
cyberwarfare is appealing (Duggan, 2015). Smaller countries with fewer resources seeking 
to gain military equivalence to more powerful nation-states can use cyber, an option that is 
cheap, available, and powerful, to level the playing field. Cyber also has very low personal 
risk compared to traditional kinetic forms of warfare (Korunka et al., 2019). A cyber-attack 
aimed at downing a combat aircraft is less likely to result in attacker casualties than if the 
attacker sent in its own combat aircraft to try to shoot it down.  
Lastly, developing offensive cyber capabilities is appealing for adversaries because 
it can be planted without the victim knowing of its presence and then can be triggered when 
the adversary sees fit. This opens many doors for coordinating large-scale, well-timed 
operations. It also keeps the defending nation in a state of uncertainty, always wary of the 
possibility that their systems have been compromised.  
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Targeting combat systems in the cyber domain is both possible and appealing to 
highly skilled, persistent threats and the impact of such an attack could be tremendous. If 
an actor were to successfully bring down a combat aircraft with a cyber-weapon, it is likely 
that the conflict would escalate to war. While cyber conflict between nations is currently 
operating well below the threshold of armed conflict, a cyber-attack that produced kinetic 
effects and resulted in loss of life could very well shift the entire geopolitical landscape 
and forever alter the role that cyber plays in it (Olejnik, 2019). Historically, armed forces 
in close proximity have experienced higher risk of force escalation, but with cyberspace, 
borders are virtualized, so constant interaction between armed forces and the potential for 
escalation between actors is always possible.  
Lawmakers are still behind the curve in addressing what to do in the event of a 
serious cyber-attack. There is currently no international stance on what determines whether 
a cyber-attack is considered an act of war or not (DoD, 2018a). It is therefore almost 
entirely up to the victim of the attack to determine what course of action, if any, to take. 
For a successful attack on a combat aircraft, the course of action would almost certainly 
involve significant retaliation. Of course, for retaliation to occur, the victim would have to 
know (or claim that they know) who attacked them. Retaliation could happen in the cyber 
domain or in the physical domain, but a kinetic response would be more likely given the 
severity of the attack.  
More importantly, launching a cyber-weapon capable of downing a combat aircraft 
would set a precedence for how warfighting is done in the future. No lives have been lost 
due to a cyber-attack, but it may just be a matter of time before that changes. Cyber is a 
new field and the customs and norms of cyber operations are still developing. If one actor 
can successfully bring down a combat platform with nothing but malware, other nations 
will likely follow suit and try to develop their own anti-aircraft cyber weapons. Cyber could 
very well be the next great arms race. 
D. HOW AN ANTI-AIRCRAFT CYBER-ATTACK MANIFESTS ITSELF 
The idea of using cyber-weapon designed to attack combat aircraft systems and 
cause functional damage to mission or flight performance may be appealing for competent, 
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determined adversaries, but how might such an attack manifest itself? It has been 
previously discussed how large a combat aircraft’s attack surface is; aircraft have many 
systems and subsystems that are connected to and operate in the cyber domain. The 
question remains- how might an adversary gain access to, exploit, and implant malicious 
code on one or more of these cyber-physical systems?  
To gain access to a combat aircraft’s highly-secured, well-monitored cyber-
systems, the attacker would almost have to be from another powerful nation-state. The term 
advanced persistent threat (APT) is used to describe the category of sophisticated, precise 
attackers backed with the resources, intelligence, and skill of a combative nation-state. 
APTs use precise methods to hit specific targets with malicious intent. Actions from APTs 
are typically slow and methodical with unmatched complexity to avoid detection (Maness, 
2020b). 
There are many methods that an APT might use to gain access to an aircraft’s cyber 
systems. An intrusion, such as a Trojan horse, trapdoor, or backdoor, is one potential 
method of accessing a susceptible system and remotely injecting malicious software 
(Maness, 2020b). Trojan horses, for example, are designed to hide malicious code in 
normal data so that the target runs the malware unknowingly. These attacks typically 
involve an unsuspecting user clicking on an email with the purpose of espionage, but the 
method could easily be applied to an unsuspecting maintenance worker who downloads 
malicious code hidden in flight data that is meant to appear normal. 
Another method that an adversary might utilize to gain access would be through 
infiltration techniques. These are used to penetrate a target network and remotely or 
physically install malicious code on those networks (Maness, 2020b). Infiltration methods 
include the use of viruses, worms, and keystroke logging. The Stuxnet worm, for example, 
was able to successfully infiltrate protected machines using stolen digital certificates 
(CSFI, 2010). If a well-designed attack can target and infiltrate specific hardware used to 
control a nuclear plant, what is to say that similar tactics could not be used to infiltrate 
third-party hardware attached to a combat aircraft?  
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Adversaries could also relatively easily use impersonations to gain physical access 
into highly-secured cyber-components. An adversary could gain access to and plant 
malicious code on aircraft hardware by becoming a respected member of a specific 
community, like an aircraft maintenance loader or an engineer at a major defense company. 
Long-term, undercover operations are not new concepts and have been known to work in 
the past. If an adversary could pretend to be a hard-working employee and earn access to a 
combat aircraft’s cyber components, they could modify or add malicious code that could 
be later triggered to cause a dysfunction. 
Lockheed Martin, one of the giants in the aerospace, defense, and technology 
industry, has developed a useful framework for understanding the steps an adversary must 
complete to launch a successful cyber-attack (Figure 5).  
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Figure 5. Lockheed Martin’s cyber kill chain. Source: Lockheed Martin 
(n.d.). 
While the Lockheed Martin cyber kill chain model can be used to better understand 
and defend against a majority of cyber-attacks, its primary focus is on attacks against 
traditional IT cyber systems. In the next chapter, a kill chain based on the ACS 
fundamentals is proposed to specifically address cyber-attacks on aircraft.  
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IV. DEVELOPING AIRCRAFT CYBER COMBAT 
SURVIVABILITY (ACCS) FROM ACS FUNDAMENTALS 
A. KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ACS AND ACCS 
Before attempting to integrate anti-aircraft cyber threats into the preexisting ACS 
model, we must highlight some important differences between cyber weapons and 
traditional KEWs. Understanding these differences is essential to defending against the 
cyber threat and creating cyber-survivable combat aircraft. 
The first difference between KEWs and cyber weapons is the difficulty of detection. 
It is relatively easy to know when an aircraft is under attack from a KEW. Today’s combat 
aircraft have special instruments designed to detect incoming missiles and launch last-
second countermeasures (Bryant, 2019). If the instruments do not warn you of an 
impending attack, the blast from the warhead will make it obvious. Cyber-attacks are much 
harder to detect. Cyber-attacks are often intentionally well-hidden and can be designed to 
make systems appear as if they are running normally. Differentiating a routine system 
failure from a hostile cyber-attack may be exceptionally challenging. Unlike with KEWs, 
there are currently no warning or detection instruments on aircraft designed to warn 
operators of an incoming cyber-attack. 
Second, cyber weapons have a nearly unlimited range and can travel across the 
world in a matter of seconds (Bryant, 2019). Kinematic relationships govern the range of 
KEWs. There are limitations as to how far and how fast missiles can travel. Cyber weapons 
do not have to fight gravity. They can be launched from anywhere in the world and, unlike 
most KEWs, a single cyber warhead can have multiple targets. Cyber weapons may be 
capable of targeting not one aircraft, but every aircraft that runs a particular version of 
software (Ball & Bryant, 2020a). The distributed nature of cyber-attacks gives cyber 
operations an incredibly large scope and makes attribution exceedingly difficult. 
The third major difference between cyber weapons and KEWs is that cyber 
weapons are much less predictable (Bryant, 2019). The underlying physics behind the 
damage caused by guns and missiles is well tested and well understood. Analysts have 
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created incredibly precise computer models to simulate the flight, accuracy, and impact of 
KEWs and have backed up these models with mandated live-fire testing. Given initial 
launch conditions, KEWs will have a predetermined and calculated range, trajectory, and 
launch envelope. Cyber weapons, their method of implantation, and their damage-causing 
mechanisms can be much more difficult to predict. Cyber weapons expose weaknesses in 
software made up of millions of lines of code. Furthermore, the attacked software often 
connects various other cyber components, each composed of millions of more lines of code. 
The virtual interactions between these immensely complex cyber components are 
incredibly difficult to predict in even the most carefully controlled lab (Ball & Bryant, 
2020a). On top of that, intrusion, infiltration, and impersonation techniques frequently take 
advantage of human factors, which again, are not easy to predict. 
Fourth, unlike KEWs, cyber weapons do not have decades of historical air combat 
data to back up combat models (Bryant, 2019). Reasonable and credible estimates are 
typically founded on historical data. Adversaries have been launching KEWs at combat 
aircraft for over one hundred years and for a majority of that time, analysts have collected 
and analyzed the combat data to enhance aircraft survivability or improve weapon lethality. 
There is no historical data on anti-aircraft cyber-attacks because the cyber threat has not 
yet been fully realized. The lack of historical evidence does not imply that cyber is not a 
legitimate anti-aircraft threat. As discussed in the previous chapter, a number of experts 
agree that cyberwarfare will play a major role in future engagements. Today’s cyberwarfare 
experts are in the same position that air warfare experts were in the beginning of the 
twentieth century, when aerial combat was nothing more than an emerging threat on the 
horizon (Bryant & Ball, 2020a). 
Finally, cyber weapons, once discovered, are easy to render harmless (Bryant & 
Ball, 2020a). Unlike modern anti-aircraft guided missiles, cyber weapons are generally 
only effective once. An air-to-air missile capable of killing a combat aircraft one day might 
still be an effective and lethal anti-aircraft option a month later. Cyber weapons, on the 
other hand, rely on small changes to data or code to be effective. If the malicious 
instructions of a cyber-weapon are discovered, uploading software patches or reloading 
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different versions of the software can easily fix the problem. This is one advantage 
defenders have against cyber weapons that they do not have against KEWs. 
B. DEFINING KEY TERMS 
Aircraft Cyber Combat Survivability is intended to be an expansion of the ACS 
design discipline; it is not to be its own, separate design discipline. As such, many of the 
terms used in ACS are also used in ACCS with some slight definition modifications. The 
definitions of key terms for both ACS and ACCS are provided below in Table 1. These 
terms are essential to the ACS design discipline, and thus, are equally essential to 
understanding ACCS. 
Table 1. ACS and ACCS definitions.  
ACS (Kinetic Threats) ACCS (Cyber Threat) 
Aircraft Combat Survivability: 
The capability of an aircraft to avoid or 
withstand a man-made hostile 
environment. To avoid means the aircraft 
avoids being physically hit be one or more 
warhead damage mechanisms. To 
withstand means the aircraft maintains an 
acceptable level of flight and mission 
essential functions, while in flight, after 
being hit by one or more warhead damage 
mechanisms. 
Aircraft Cyber Combat Survivability: 
The capability of an aircraft to avoid or 
withstand a hostile cyber environment. To 
avoid means either the aircraft avoids the 
implantation of a cyber-weapon’s 
dysfunction mechanism into the aircraft’s 
internal cyber systems or the aircraft 
avoids the subsequent activation or 
triggering of a successfully implanted 
dysfunction mechanism. To withstand 
means the aircraft maintains an acceptable 
level of flight and mission essential 
functions, while in flight, after the 
activation or triggering of one or more 
implanted warhead dysfunction 
mechanisms. 
 
Man-Made Hostile Environment: 
The threat environment including 
Command and Control mechanisms, 
search mechanisms such as radars, 
warhead delivery mechanisms such as 
guns and missiles, and warheads such as 
ballistic projectiles and exploding 
warheads. 
Hostile Cyber Environment: 
The cyber threat environment including 
wired and wireless communication 
pathways, Command and Control 
mechanisms, cyber search mechanisms 
such as scanning or sensing, cyber 
warhead delivery mechanisms such 
malware, and cyber warheads such as 
implanted malicious functionality. 
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ACS (Kinetic Threats) ACCS (Cyber Threat) 
Aircraft Susceptibility:  
The inability of an aircraft to avoid being 
physically hit by one or more warhead 
damage mechanisms associated with 
KEWs. The more likely an aircraft is to be 
hit by one or more kinetic energy warhead 
damage mechanisms, the more susceptible 
the aircraft is. 
Aircraft Cyber Susceptibility: 
The inability of an aircraft to avoid having 
portions of its internal cyber code 
accessed, modified, and activated or 
triggered by a cyber-weapon’s 
dysfunction mechanism. The more likely 
an aircraft’s internal cyber system is to be 
accessed, modified, and activated by one 
or more cyber-weapons, the more cyber 
susceptible the aircraft is. 
Aircraft Vulnerability: 
The inability of an aircraft to withstand, 
while in flight, one or more hits by 
warhead damage mechanism hits 
associated with KE weapons. The more 
likely an aircraft is unable to withstand 
one or more hits by the kinetic energy 
warhead damage mechanisms, the more 
vulnerable the aircraft is. 
 
Aircraft Cyber Vulnerability: 
The inability of an aircraft to withstand 
the activation or triggering of a 
successfully implanted malfunction 
mechanism. The more likely an aircraft is 
unable to withstand the activation of an 
implanted malfunction mechanism, the 
more vulnerable the aircraft is. 
Kinetic Energy Warhead: 
KEWs include guns, with their ballistic 
projectiles, and guided missiles, with their 
tube or rail launchers. Every KEW has a 
warhead. The warhead consists of, 
contains, or generates the physical 
entity(s) that can cause damage to an 
aircraft’s components when they impact 
on, or hit, the aircraft. For the smaller 
guns, the warhead is the ballistic projectile 
itself, which may consist of an armor-
piercing penetrator (AP), or it may also 
contain incendiary particles intended to 
start an internal fire (API). For both the 
larger guns and the guided missiles, the 
warhead contains a high explosive (HE) 
core with a surrounding metal case. The 
HE core detonates either upon impact on 
the aircraft, or in proximity to the aircraft, 
generating a blast wave and high velocity 
warhead case metal fragments. The 
penetrators, incendiary particles, blast 
wave, and warhead case fragments are the 
warhead’s damage-causing mechanisms. 
Cyber Warhead: 
A cyber-weapon warhead consists of a set 
of malicious computer instructions that is 
designed to gain access to the aircraft’s 
internal cyber system and subsequently 
command one or more aircraft flight 
critical or mission-critical components to 
dysfunction. The set of malicious 
instructions or commands is the cyber-
weapon’s warhead and the specific 
component dysfunction(s) contained in 
the set of malicious instructions is known 
as the warhead’s dysfunction 
mechanism(s). 
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ACS (Kinetic Threats) ACCS (Cyber Threat) 
Damage Mechanism: 
The physical entity that causes damage to 
the aircraft. The damage mechanisms for 
high explosive warheads and penetrator 
type weapons are typically metallic 
penetrators and fragments, incendiary 
materials, and blasts. 
Dysfunction Mechanism: 
The malicious computer code that causes 
the loss or degradation of system 
capabilities or the output of the cyber-
warhead that causes functional damage to 
the target. The dysfunction mechanisms 
for anti-aircraft cyber warheads include  
functionally damaging an aircraft’s 
critical components, disrupting or 
changing information that will cause 
operators to make poor decisions, or 
falsely representing data to cause a forced 
landing. 
 
Survivability Enhancement Concept: 
General functions or concepts 
fundamental to survivability enhancement 
and reducing either the susceptibility or 
the vulnerability of the aircraft. 
 
Cyber Survivability Enhancement 
Concept: 
General functions or concepts 
fundamental to cyber survivability 
enhancement and reducing either the 
cyber susceptibility or the cyber 
vulnerability of the aircraft. 
 
Survivability Enhancement Feature: 
Any particular characteristic of the 
aircraft, design, design of supporting 
systems, or operational procedures that 
reduce either the susceptibility or the 
vulnerability of the aircraft. These 
features can improve an aircraft’s 
survivability. 
Cyber Survivability Enhancement 
Feature: 
Any particular characteristic of the 
aircraft, design, design of supporting 
systems, or operational procedures that 
reduce either the cyber susceptibility or 
the cyber vulnerability of the aircraft. 
These features can improve an aircraft’s 
cyber survivability.  
 
Adapted from Ball & Bryant, 2020a; Ball & Bryant, 2020b, and Ball & Bryant, 2020c 
 
C. CYBER PROBABILISTIC KILL CHAIN 
The same probabilistic kill chain used in ACS for engagement-level survivability 
assessment can be adapted to address cyber weapons as well. This modified cyber-
survivability kill chain can be implemented in the same way as the previously discussed 
ACS probabilistic kill chain for kinetic weapons (Ball, 2003). The purpose of this cyber 
kill chain serves the same purpose as the traditional probabilistic kill chain: “to illustrate 
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the major phases and outcomes that occur in the one-on-one scenario and to define the 
terminology and the probability associated with each of the phase outcomes.” 
A new ACCS kill chain (Figure 6), adapted from the ACS kill chain (Ball, 2003), 
can be divided into two sections: a susceptibility section and a vulnerability section. For an 
aircraft to be susceptible to a cyber-engagement, the adversary must perform the following 
five tasks (Ball & Bryant, 2020b). A weapon must actively search for the aircraft and its 
cyber-physical components. The aircraft must then be detected in cyberspace, so that the 
cyber-warhead can be launched and delivered to the aircraft. The cyber-warhead must then 
be successfully implanted into the target aircraft’s systems. And finally, the aircraft is hit  
by the cyber-warhead when the implanted malware is triggered, causing component and 
system dysfunctions. All five of these steps must take place, in that order, for an aircraft to 
be hit by a cyber-weapon.  
For an attrition or mission kill to result from said hit, the dysfunction caused by the 
cyber-warhead must cause enough functional damage to the aircraft’s cyber-systems that 
flight or mission essential functions are lost and cannot be recovered. This last step of the 
kill chain makes up its vulnerability section. 
41 
 
Figure 6. ACCS probabilistic kill chain. Adapted from Ball & Bryant 
(2020b). 
The schematic of the probabilistic cyber kill chain shows both the susceptibility 
and vulnerability sections as well as the individual phases associated with them. It also 
shows the process of the cyber-attack as a linear, time-wise sequence. Following the kill 
chain from top to bottom, if one event does not occur, then the chain is broken and none of 
the following phases can occur. The outcome in such a scenario would the survival of the 
combat aircraft.  
In traditional ACS, probabilities are used for each phase of the kinetic ACS kill 
chain because the outcomes for each phase cannot be known with certainty (Ball, 2003). 
This uncertainty is amplified in the cyber domain because of the covert nature of attacks, 
the rapidly changing level of cyber capabilities, and the lack of historical data of cyber-
attacks on combat platforms. This makes determining probabilities much more difficult to 
develop. Nonetheless, ranges of probabilities can be applied to each phase of the cyber kill 
chain to help estimate the overall likelihood that an attempted cyber-attack would result in 
an aircraft kill (Bryant, 2019). These probabilities measure the likelihood of success or 
failure at each point along the kill chain, and can be multiplied together to determine the 
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overall survivability or killability of an aircraft. An aircraft will be killed by a cyber-
warhead if and only if each of the phases produce successful outcomes. This is an important 
concept for designing survivable cyber systems. To enhance cyber survivability, the 
probability that one or more of these phases is successful must be reduced.  
The probabilistic outcomes associated with the cyber kill chain can be used in the 
same way that they are used for the traditional ACS kill chain (Ball, 2003). There are only 
two possible outcomes, success or failure, for each phase of the kill chain. Each outcome 
for each phase is represented by a branch of the kill chain and has a probability associated 
with it. For a given phase, the success and failure probabilities must add to one. Likewise, 
the probability of survival and the probability of kill must also add to one. Determining the 
probability that the cyber-warhead kills the aircraft is done by simply multiplying the 
success branch probabilities.  
Because of the higher uncertainty associated with cyber-attacks, confidence 
intervals on probability distributions can be used instead of single values for each phase 
(Bryant, 2019). Experts in the cybersecurity field can come up with reasonable and credible 
estimates for these probabilities. These ranges of probabilities can then be used to model 
cyber-attacks on combat aircraft using Monte Carlo simulations. This idea is discussed in 
depth in Chapter VI. 
Starting from the top of the kill chain, 𝑃𝐴 represents the probability that an 
adversary has a cyber-weapon that is actively searching for the target (Ball & Bryant, 
2020b). This probability includes the likelihood that an adversary is able to develop a 
cyber-weapon. Through reconnaissance, adversaries can determine how to gain access and 
exploit one or more of the aircraft’s cyber-systems. Without the knowledge of how an 
aircraft’s cyber-systems work, how to gain access to those systems, and how to exploit the 
data or code on those systems, an adversary would be unable to detect, launch, implement, 
hit, and kill the combat aircraft with their cyber-warhead. If an adversary is able to 
successfully develop an anti-aircraft cyber weapon and if that weapon is actively searching 
for its target, the attack moves down to the next phase of the kill chain. A failed first phase 
results in the survival of the aircraft.  
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The second phase of the cyber kill chain is the detect phase. This phase 
characterizes the likelihood that a developed cyber-weapon is able to detect the aircraft in 
cyberspace and detect a pathway to access the aircraft’s internal cyber-systems. Detecting 
aircraft in the cyber domain can be more difficult for adversaries because aircraft are not 
continuously connected to the Internet. While air-gapping cyber systems make detection 
more difficult for the attacker, it does not guarantee aircraft survivability (Bryant & Young, 
2019). As mentioned previously, there have been instances where seemingly secure, air-
gapped cyber systems were successfully attacked (CSFI, 2010). 
Conditional probabilities are used to more easily associate probabilities with 
specific phases. 𝑃𝐷|𝐴 denotes the probability of successful detection given that the active  
phase already took place and was successful. Analyzing the probabilities in this way allows 
us to address each branch of the kill chain without reliance on the outcomes of previous 
phases. The overall probability that the cyber-weapon can detect the aircraft and a 
sufficient pathway (𝑃𝐷) is the probability of active multiplied with the probability of 
detection given active. Again, a scenario in which the active reconnaissance phase is 
successful, but the detection phase is unsuccessful will result in the survival of the aircraft. 
If all previous phases are successful, we move down the kill chain to the next attack phase. 
The third phase of the cyber kill chain is the launch phase. The launch phase occurs 
after the aircraft and a potential pathway have been detected in cyberspace and the 
adversary launches their operation. During the launch phase, the malware on the cyber-
warhead is sent to the target through cyberspace. There are multiple ways of launching a 
cyber-warhead and the malware may infect multiple hosts before finding its way to the 
target system. The probabilities associated with the launch phase and the way that these 
probabilities are used follow that of the previous two phases. 𝑃𝐿|𝐷 is the probability of 
successful launch given successful detection. 𝑃𝐿|𝐷 is independent of the outcome of other 
phases of the cyber kill chain. 𝑃𝐿 is the probability of a successful launch and is the product 
of 𝑃𝐿|𝐷, 𝑃𝐷|𝐴, and 𝑃𝐴.  
The next phase after a successful launch is the implementation phase. During this 
phase, the cyber-weapon reaches the aircraft and successfully implements the cyber-
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warhead’s malware. Implementation is a necessary step for cyber-attacks because many 
attacks do not go into effect immediately. Well-designed cyber-attacks can be installed on 
a given systems well before they are triggered. The adversary’s goal in this phase is to 
exploit an unknown flaw in the aircraft’s system (zero-day attack) and implement a way to 
maintain access for an extended period of time. 𝑃𝐼|𝐿 represents the probability of successful 
implementation given a successful launch. 𝑃𝐼 represents the total probability of 
implementation and is the product of all of the conditional probabilities from the phases 
that precede it.  
The final phase of the susceptibility section of the cyber kill chain is the hit phase. 
This phase starts, not when the cyber-warhead reaches the target, but when the cyber-
warhead is triggered, after the adversary has successfully installed the malware on the 
aircraft’s cyber-system. Implanted malware can go days, months, or even years without 
being detected before an adversary decides to trigger its effects. The triggering of the cyber-
weapon results in component or system dysfunctions, which lead to functional damage of 
the aircraft. Depending on the aircraft’s level of vulnerability to cyber-based attacks, it is 
this functional damage that may or may not result in a mission or aircraft kill. The 
susceptibility of an aircraft is synonymous to the probability that the aircraft is hit during 
an engagement, where 𝑃𝐻 is the product of each of the conditional probabilities from 
previous phases up until this point (Equation 4) (Ball, 2003).  
𝑃𝐻 = 𝑃𝐴 × 𝑃𝐷|𝐴 × 𝑃𝐿|𝐷 × 𝑃𝐼|𝐿 × 𝑃𝐻|𝐼              (4) 
Like each of the other phases, 𝑃𝐻|𝐼 represents the probability the aircraft is hit given the 
successful implementation of the cyber-warhead.  
The vulnerability phase, or kill phase, of the cyber kill chain is what happens after 
the aircraft has been hit and the dysfunction mechanisms associated with the cyber-
warhead have begun to take effect. If the cyber-warhead makes it this far down the kill 
chain, this phase determines whether an aircraft hit by a cyber-warhead survives or is 
killed. Vulnerability in ACCS is synonymous with the probability of an aircraft kill given 
a hit from a cyber-weapon (Ball, 2003). If the damaged aircraft is able to suppress the 
dysfunctions and/or recover from the attack, the engagement will result in survival. If the 
aircraft is unable to withstand this damage, the engagement will result in a kill. 
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For an aircraft to survive a cyber-attack, all that is needed is for the cyber kill chain 
to be broken somewhere along the way. If methods are in place to stop an adversary from 
detecting an aircraft in cyberspace, the engagement will result in survival. If a cyber-
weapon is developed and launched, but is unable to be successfully implanted on an 
aircraft’s cyber-system for an extended period of time, the engagement will result in 
survival. Aircraft survival can result even if the cyber-weapon successfully hits an aircraft, 
but the resulting dysfunctions are sufficiently managed and the aircraft is able to recover. 
While it is better to break the kill chain earlier rather than later, it is important to design for 
any scenario. Today’s adversaries are highly capable and persistent; we should not 
underestimate their ability to launch sophisticated cyber-attacks. 
D. DYSFUNCTION MECHANISM AND POTENTIAL ATTACK VECTORS 
OF A CYBER WEAPON 
Damage mechanisms of traditional anti-aircraft KEWs produce kinetic effects. In 
Chapter II, damage mechanism was defined as the physical entity that causes damage to 
the target (Adams, 2019b). Historically, the kinetic warheads attached to anti-aircraft 
weapons used one or more of the following damage mechanisms to take down combat 
aircraft: 1) metallic penetrators and fragments, 2) incendiary materials, and 3) blasts (Ball, 
2003). Cyber weapons, however, rarely cause physical damage. They cause functional 
damage, or dysfunctions. The result of a successful cyber-attack on a combat aircraft would 
be the dysfunction of critical cyber-components due to some sort of malware. The 
dysfunction of these critical components could then lead to either an attrition kill or mission 
kill. 
In the cyber domain, a dysfunction mechanism is a term used to describe the output 
of the cyber-warhead that causes functional damage to the target. Dysfunction mechanisms 
for anti-aircraft cyber weapons depend on the type of malware implanted on an aircraft’s 
cyber-physical systems. Theoretically, a cyber-warhead can be designed to 1) functionally 
damage an aircraft’s critical components, 2) disrupt or change information that will cause 
operators to make poor decisions, or 3) falsely represent data that will force the pilot to 
land the aircraft (Alexandrovich, n.d.). While these dysfunction mechanisms describe some 
of the means of producing functional damage, they are not all-inclusive. New, more 
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sophisticated, and more creative cyber threats are developing every year, introducing more 
potential dysfunction mechanisms to an already growing list.  
For dysfunction mechanisms to cause functional damage to an aircraft, the cyber-
warhead must first take advantage of one of an aircraft’s many attack vectors. Attack 
vectors are routes that cyber weapons may take to infiltrate and exploit a target’s cyber-
systems or network. Attack vectors on combat aircraft include 1) specific, targetable cyber 
hardware, 2) communication channels, 3) software patches, and 4) the supply chain 
(Alexandrovich, n.d.).  
One example of a specific piece of targetable hardware on an aircraft is an 
electronic flight bag (EFB). An EFB is an electronic information management device used 
to help operators manage and perform tasks more easily and efficiently. Adversaries could 
get access to a pilot’s EFB by targeting that specific piece of hardware with advanced 
infiltration or intrusion techniques. The attacker could then manipulate the information 
seen on the EFB or degrade its capabilities and render the equipment useless. The terminal 
effect of an attack on an EFB might be poor decision making by the pilot or crewmembers 
based on false information. If the attack rendered the system inoperable, the pilot may be 
forced to land without completing its mission. This attack vector applies not just to EFBs, 
but to any piece of hardware that is targetable in the cyber domain and is flight or mission 
essential.  
 Communication channels between aircraft or between the aircraft and ground crew 
provide another route for adversaries to launch their cyber-attack. Many communication 
channels create unprotected, open links that can be intercepted by an adversary. Increasing 
the use of new communication and data transfer technologies puts operators at a higher risk 
of those channels being hacked or compromised. The figure below (Figure 7) outlines the 
attack surface of a general combat aircraft, but the cyber-physical systems and open 
communication channels will vary depending on the platform and mission. 
47 
 
Figure 7. Communication channels attack surface. Source: Ball and Bryant 
(2020b). 
Aircraft communication channels are not always encrypted or protected and contain 
highly sensitive information. There is a possibility that, if an attacker were to intercept 
these signals, they could inject false information or cut off the communication lines 
altogether (National Business Aviation Association, 2016). Additionally, attackers may not 
have to send all elements of their weapon through the same access point (Ball & Bryant, 
2020b). If an aircraft’s network of cyber components is not thoroughly air-gapped, 
attackers may be able to gain access using one access point and deliver the cyber-warhead 
on another. 
Software updates provide adversaries with another potential attack vector. Software 
bugs are relatively common and can have disastrous effects. Take for instance, the Boeing 
737 Max. A seemingly minute software dysfunction involving onboard sensors and flight 
controls combined with a lack of sufficient manual redundancy or training resulted in 
multiple crashes and many lost lives (Disis & Pham, 2019). Now imagine if a highly 
capable adversary, who knew of the software patch and could reverse engineer what 
problems the patch was fixing, intentionally planted these bugs. The results could be 
catastrophic. Software updates are never perfect. They can highlight vulnerabilities in older 
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software versions and introduce new ones. Additionally, when aircraft software is 
uploaded, the air-gap breaks and the aircraft becomes open to potential cyber-attacks.  
The supply chain also introduces a unique attack vector (Alexandrovich, n.d.). A 
supply chain attack is an attack that involves physically tampering with cyber components 
during the handling, distributing, or manufacturing stages of production. The intent of a 
supply chain attack is to install undetectable malware during the production phase, before 
the equipment becomes operational (Pipeline & Gas Journal, 2012). Remember, implanted 
malware can remain dormant for months or years before being triggered. 
The cyber-components of a combat aircraft can come from various production 
facilities. Several people may have access to these systems throughout different stages of 
production.  Attackers can take advantage of less-secure elements of a complex supply 
network to launch their attack. Insider threats are not uncommon within the DoD. If an 
adversary could pretend to be a hard-working employee and earn access to a combat 
aircraft’s cyber components, they could modify data or add malicious code that could later 









V. DESIGNING FOR THE CYBER THREAT USING AIRCRAFT 
COMBAT SURVIVABILITY FUNDAMENTALS 
The purpose of Aircraft Combat Survivability is to design and build combat 
systems that can avoid or withstand hostile actions in a man-made, hostile environment 
(Ball, 2003). To enhance the survivability of combat aircraft, either susceptibility or 
vulnerability need to be reduced. For traditional KEWs, the moment the weapon hits (or 
fuses in close proximity to) the aircraft is the threshold used to differentiate when 
susceptibility stops and vulnerability starts. A combat aircraft is less susceptible if it can 
avoid being hit. A combat aircraft is less vulnerable if, given a hit, it can withstand the 
damage from the weapon and prevent an aircraft or mission kill. In Chapter II, 
susceptibility and vulnerability reduction concepts were briefly discussed for enhancing 
survivability against kinetic attacks. In this chapter, those concepts will be modified and 
redefined to enhance survivability against cyber threats. 
The ACS susceptibility and vulnerability reduction concepts are universal to attacks 
from traditional KEWs, but many of the same concepts can be applied to attacks from 
cyber-weapons as well. Table 2 highlights the differences between the susceptibility and 
vulnerability reduction concepts of ACS and the proposed susceptibility and vulnerability 
reduction concepts for ACCS (Aircraft Cyber Combat Survivability). These concepts, if 












Table 2. ACS versus ACCS survivability enhancement concepts 
ACS ACCS 
Susceptibility Reduction Concepts 
1. Situational Awareness 
2. Signature Reduction & Control 
3. Noise Jamming and Deceiving 
4. Expendables 
5. Threat Suppression 
6. Weapons & Tactics, Flight Performance, 
and Crew Training & Proficiency 
1. Situational Awareness 
2. Signature Reduction/Management 
3. Cybersecurity Hardening 
4. Deception and Decoys 
5. Threat Suppression 
6. Tactics, System Performance, and Crew 
Training & Proficiency 
Vulnerability Reduction Concepts 
1. Component Redundancy (with Physical 
Separation) 
2. Component Location 
3. Component Elimination or Replacement 
4. Component Shielding 
5. Damage Suppression 
6. Recovery 
1. System Redundancy with Diversity 
2. Component Location and Logical 
Separation 
3. Component Elimination or Replacement 
4. Component Shielding 
5. Dysfunction Suppression 
6. Recovery 
 
While there are many parallels between the susceptibility and vulnerability 
reduction concepts for ACS and ACCS, the functions and implementations of the cyber-
based susceptibility and vulnerability reduction concepts are much different.  
For this discussion, it is essential to define where along the cyber kill chain 
susceptibility stops and vulnerability starts. A “hit” by a cyber-weapon is defined as the 
moment the malicious code is triggered by an adversary. This means that a combat aircraft 
vulnerable to a cyber-attack is unable to withstand the dysfunctions caused after a cyber-
warhead has been triggered. Susceptibility, then, is used to define the aircraft’s inability to 
avoid the detection, launch, implantation, and triggering of a cyber-weapon. 
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A. SUSCEPTIBILITY REDUCTION CONCEPTS FOR ACCS 
1. Situational Awareness 
Situational awareness is the ability to be alert and responsive to one’s surroundings 
and the current threat environment. Just as kinetic weapons produce detectable signals that 
can indicate whether an aircraft has been targeted, cyber weapons produce emissions and 
unique signals that can indicate if an aircraft is in danger of a cyber-attack (Ball & Bryant, 
2020c). However, cyber-attacks differ from kinetic attacks in that attackers put much more 
effort into hiding the presence and effects of cyber-attacks. Modern combat aircraft also 
routinely fail and operate unexpectedly, adding additional challenges for determining if the 
cause of the failure was routine or from a hostile cyber-attack. While this makes it more 
difficult for operators to be aware of active cyber threats, there are still effective reporting 
and monitoring techniques that can be implemented to enhance situational awareness. 
Before a cyber-attack is triggered, active monitoring, cyber threat warning, and 
attestation measures can be used to reduce an aircraft’s susceptibility to cyber-attacks. 
Active monitoring is a type of systematic observation in which regular surveillance of 
cyber-physical systems is maintained over a long period of time. Monitoring systems can 
operate on exterior IT support systems or on interior combat systems built into the aircraft 
(Ball & Bryant, 2020c). Active monitoring can be done with or without the use of 
personnel. Personnel can be used to periodically check networks and observe 
communication traffic for hostile presence. Experts can use various IT-monitoring 
techniques to observe data, signatures, and logs to detect changes in code or data. 
Automated software can also be installed on the aircraft itself to monitor files that should 
not change and notify operators if and when they do. Cyber threat warning is the urgent 
communication and acknowledgment that an immediate cyber-threat is present (Bryant & 
Young, 2019). Warning aircraft operators of an imminent cyber threat gives them time to 
respond to the threat.  
Attestation, the act of showing that something is true, is any method of verifying 
that code is unaltered and can be a powerful tool to warn operators of potential cyber threats 
(Bryant & Young, 2019). Attestation on an aircraft works by injecting data into a friendly 
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cyber-system. The timing of the response and the response itself can then indicate if the 
code had been changed or altered in any way. Attestation is very similar in practice to 
hashing in traditional IT cybersecurity. Attestation is a one-way function that uses a 
complex mathematical algorithm to create a string of values (referred to as hashes) unique 
to a certain file, program, or software code (Nohe, 2019). No two files can create the same 
string value. Any alteration of code or data, a comma out of place or a 1 that should be a 
0, will produce a very different hash value. If the string that is returned from the attestation 
algorithm matches what is expected for that cyber-system, it verifies that the data has not 
been altered, modified, or tampered with. Attestation helps ensure that those who are 
supposed to be altering code (for software updates or patches) are the only ones doing so. 
While attestation encompasses not just one, but any number of methods of verifying the 
integrity of data, the primary purpose of verifying the data is to warn operators of potential 
cyber threats. A hash that has changed unexpectedly is a sign that foul play from a threat 
actor may be occurring.  
Situational awareness also involves being aware of the global landscape, the threat 
actors that may be operating in a contested cyber environment, and the methods they 
typically use to launch cyber-attacks. If operators are properly educated of the current cyber 
threat environment, they can take necessary precautions to reduce the likelihood of actors 
successfully implanting malware on protected systems.  
One of the first steps to addressing a cyber-attack is being aware of who the threat 
actors are and recognizing when a threat is present. To be situationally aware, operators 
must understand how critical cyber systems operate. Operators should be able to identify 
parts of their cyber systems that may be susceptible to a cyber-based attack and be able to 
recognize when an imminent cyber-threat may be attempting to access a system. Because 
cyber-attacks are designed to be covert, the importance of having good situational 
awareness in the cyber domain cannot be overstated. With malicious code installed, combat 
systems may appear to operate normally until the enemy chooses to initiate the attack. Even 
then, it may be difficult to differentiate a cyber-based attack from a typical hardware or 
maintenance issue. Having situational awareness is critical; the proper response to a cyber-
based attack cannot begin to happen if the cyber-attack is never found or recognized. 
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Having good situational awareness of an aircraft’s cyber-physical systems reduces its 
susceptibility to a cyber-attack by increasing the likelihood that malware is discovered and 
removed before the cyber warhead has a chance to be triggered by an adversary.  
2. Signature Reduction/Management 
Signature reduction/management is the ability to reduce or regulate the 
observability of an aircraft and its cyber-physical components in cyberspace. In traditional 
ACS, combat aircraft give off visual, IR, radar, and acoustic signatures which can be 
observed by adversaries and their air-defense systems (Ball, 2003). Reducing an aircraft’s 
signature reduces how observable the aircraft is to an air-defense system and therefore 
improves survivability by reducing the likelihood that the combat aircraft is detected.  
A similar approach can be applied in the cyber domain. By making an aircraft’s 
cyber systems less observable to an adversary, the code on those systems become more 
difficult to access and exploit and therefore harder to hit in cyberspace. For a cyber-weapon 
to be effective, it must successfully search for, locate, and deliver malicious code to an 
aircraft via an attack vector. Managing the cyber signature of combat aircraft reduces the 
likelihood that adversaries can locate and access a combat aircraft’s cyber-systems. 
Computers, their networks, and the data traveling across them are observable in 
cyberspace. An aircraft’s cyber emissions include any signal or data transfer that takes 
place in cyberspace. Adversaries often use active cyber scanning techniques to locate 
hardware in cyberspace, but cyber defenses can be put in place to block, track, and disrupt 
an adversary’s attempt at locating an aircraft’s protected systems.  
The most common way of reducing an aircraft’s cyber signature is through “air-
gapping” (Ball & Bryant, 2020c). Air gapping involves physically separating and isolating 
a secure network from unsecure networks. Air gapping, however, should not be the only 
protective measure taken to ensure survivability. Many systems are presumed to be 
adequately air gapped, when in fact the “protected” systems are merely a well-hidden 
member of an overall unsecure network. If an aircraft’s cyber system connects to a ground 
system that connects to another, more vulnerable system, then an attacker has a path for 
launching an attack. The first step toward reducing an aircraft’s cyber signature should be 
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examining the connection points that the aircraft has with external systems (Ball & Bryant, 
2020c). 
Cyber signature can also be effectively managed by limiting non-essential 
emissions and hiding essential emissions. More advanced methods for managing an 
aircraft’s cyber signature include changing network and address naming structures so that 
an aircraft’s location in cyberspace changes over time (Ball & Bryant, 2020c). A constantly 
changing target is much harder to hit than a stagnant one. Periodic reconfigurations of cyber 
structures might render an adversary’s thorough reconnaissance useless. By reducing or 
managing an aircraft’s cyber-signature, the likelihood that the cyber-weapon can detect an 
aircraft and successfully launch a cyber-warhead at it is reduced.  
3. Cybersecurity Hardening 
Cybersecurity hardening involves the selective restriction of access to cyber-
systems and the information contained therein. The process of restricting access across the 
cyber domain is done so that only friendly forces can access and/or manipulate an aircraft’s 
systems or data. This concept involves assessing platforms, missions, and network systems 
and applying firewalls, implementing security tools, tightening policies, and adding 
security software or hardware to at-risk systems to make them more difficult for an 
adversary to access. The goal of cybersecurity hardening is to reduce the attack surface by 
reducing the number of points that the system can be attacked from. Setting up firewalls, 
limiting administrator privileges, whitelisting and blacklisting, and employing multi-factor 
authentication are examples of methods that can be used to control access and reduce the 
attack surface of our systems (Bryant & Young, 2019).  
Before securing the aircraft’s cyber components, defenders should first focus on 
securing supporting IT equipment using traditional cybersecurity measures. If an adversary 
can gain access to the supporting equipment that connects to the combat aircraft, they can 
potentially gain access to the aircraft itself. Cybersecurity hardening measures that can be 
taken to protect supporting IT equipment include firewalls and limiting administrative 
privileges.  
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Firewalls are network security systems that monitor and regulate incoming and 
outgoing traffic based on a set of security rules. Firewalls act as barriers between trusted 
internal networks and untrusted external networks, so that not all information and users on 
the internet (or other untrusted external networks) can access protected military networks.  
Administrator privileges are the highest level of rights granted to a user of a 
computer or network. Access to administrator privileges would give adversaries the ability 
to make significant unauthorized changes to an aircraft’s cyber-components or large 
software programs such as flight database management systems. Administrator privileges 
might also allow an adversary to navigate protected, internal networks to gain access to 
more hardware and software, increasing the scope and potential damage of a cyber-attack. 
Administrator privileges should be well protected with multi-factor authorization and the 
number of people with administrator privileges should be limited to reduce the likelihood 
that an adversary is able to exploit human vulnerabilities.  
Locks and login credentials are powerful mechanisms for controlling access to 
critical flight hardware or software, but locks and login credentials have to be strong to be 
effective. Multi-factor authentication is an access control method that requires a user to 
offer more than one piece of evidence to access a system or network (Bryant & Young, 
2019). A combination of knowledge (password or security question that the user knows), 
possession (a key or government ID that a user holds), and inherence (something that the 
user is such as facial recognition or fingerprint scanning) creates authentication 
mechanisms that can be used for multi-factor authentication (Bryant, 2016).  
The second part of cybersecurity hardening requires defenders to harden the cyber 
systems on the aircraft itself. One of the more prominent attack vectors for cyber-attacks 
is software updates. Hardening an aircraft’s cyber systems should include verifying that 
software updates and code loaded on to the aircraft is well-trusted (Ball & Bryant, 2020c).  
Additional methods of securing an aircraft’s cyber systems include whitelisting and 
blacklisting. Whitelisting is the practice of explicitly allowing only known, trusted entities 
to access a particular system (Bryant & Young, 2019). Whitelisting solutions allow only 
previously approved and trusted programs and code to run on an aircraft’s cyber systems. 
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If the code comes from another source, it will not run. Blacklisting is the opposite; it 
prohibits known, suspicious entities from accessing particular systems. Blacklisting 
solutions can only be applied after malware has been detected; it is therefore not the 
preferred method for hardening an aircraft’s cyber systems, but can be useful in protecting 
IT systems. Whitelisting and blacklisting are additional measures to control who can and 
cannot access flight or mission-critical aircraft systems. Cybersecurity hardening reduces 
susceptibility by decreasing the probability that an adversary is able to successfully access 
and implant malware on protected cyber systems. 
4. Deception and Decoys 
Deception is the act of causing an adversary to believe that something false is true 
in order to gain an advantage. In most cases, deception involves feeding false data back to 
the enemy to have them believe that they are successfully attacking your systems, when in 
fact they are attacking a decoy or a system that has already been protected from said attack 
(Bryant & Young, 2019). With kinetic weapons, it is fairly easy to determine if an attack 
was successful or not because the extent of the damage can be observed. With cyber 
weapons, battle damage assessment is much more challenging (Ball & Bryant, 2020c). The 
perceived success of an attack is generally reliant on information fed back to the adversary. 
If defenders can return misleading information or inject noise into the feedback signal, 
attackers will begin to doubt their cyber capabilities altogether, potentially reducing the 
number of future attacks (Libicki, 2007). Adversaries will begin to doubt the validity of 
any feedback after being successfully deceived once. 
Decoys are fake versions of cyber-systems, strategically placed to trick or confuse 
an adversary into attacking a false system. One of the most commonly used decoys in the 
cyber domain is a honeypot. Honeypots are fake computers or networks that are used as 
bait to attract a cyber-attack. These honeypots have no operational significance, but traffic 
on these fake networks lets defenders observe the techniques and objectives of attackers. 
This information is extremely useful for designing more secure systems in the future 
because defenses can be tailored to specific threats. Trapping the weapon in a honeypot 
also allows defenders to check their real systems for similar malware. The knowledge of 
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an attempted cyber-attack that can be attributed to a particular nation-state or group also 
can be used as leverage.  
Deceiving adversaries using false cyber-systems reduces susceptibility by 
decreasing the likelihood that the cyber warhead is successfully implemented on real 
systems. Learning how an adversary carries out a cyber-attack gives defenders the ability 
to tailor countermeasures to specific threats, decreasing the likelihood that future attacks 
will be successful. 
5. Threat Suppression 
Threat suppression is an offensive effort that degrades the performance of an 
opposing forces’ cyber-weapon capabilities below what is needed to accomplish their 
objectives (Ball, 2003). The purpose of cyber threat suppression is to attack an adversary’s 
systems before they can attack yours and the goal is to disrupt, deny, or destroy the 
capabilities and cyber infrastructure needed for an adversary to carry out a successful 
cyber-attack.  Threat suppression can be done either kinetically or in the cyber domain, 
though a kinetic response to a cyber-threat may often be ineffective.  
Given the covert nature of cyber-attacks and the challenge of locating the exact 
source of a piece of malware, threat suppression by kinetic means (i.e. strategic bombing 
of enemy hardware) would be very difficult. It is also likely that an adversary would have 
multiple computers that they could launch the attack from. However, the threat of a kinetic 
or cyber-based retaliation may sufficiently deter an adversary from attempting a large-scale 
cyber-attack in the first place. A rival nation-state might not launch a sophisticated, anti-
aircraft cyber campaign against the U.S. for fear that they might be caught. The fear of 
retaliation through kinetic or cyber means or through influential economic sanctions may 
be enough to discourage the attack in the first place. 
Threat suppression via the cyber domain would require highly skilled personnel. 
The cyber professionals would have to be able to gain access and exploit enemy systems 
to prevent hostile cyber-weapons from achieving their intended effects. Successful threat 
suppression does not necessarily require entirely destroying enemy hardware or software. 
Just a slight modification to an adversary’s cyber weapon could render it completely 
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useless. Threat suppression reduces susceptibility to cyber-attacks by disrupting, denying, 
or destroying an adversary’s cyber capabilities before the cyber-warhead is able to be 
triggered. In short, threat suppression aims to breaks the cyber kill chain by breaking the 
cyber weapon.  
6. Tactics, System Performance, and Crew Training and Proficiency 
This susceptibility reduction concept encompasses specific actions or strategies 
used to address cyber threats, the performance of the cyber-systems attached to a combat 
aircraft, and the proficiency of the military personnel that handle those cyber-systems. One 
relatively easy tactic for potentially improving system performance is to periodically 
update and reconfiguring combat networks. Accessing and exploiting a system in a 
dynamic cyber domain that is constantly moving and changing is much more difficult. 
Malicious code designed to operate against an older version of combat software may 
become obsolete against a newer or different network.  
Another tactic that can be used to reduce susceptibility is incorporating friendly 
“red teams” that act as adversaries (Bryant & Young, 2019). Red teams are groups of white-
hat hackers that attack digital infrastructure as an attacker would. One of two things can be 
learned from this sort of penetration testing of cyber-systems. Either the red team would 
be unable to access an aircraft’s protected cyber systems, verifying a low level of 
susceptibility, or the red team would be able to access an aircraft’s protected cyber 
components, highlighting previously unknown areas of susceptibility that can now be 
fixed. 
Patching known flaws in susceptible combat software is a way to enhance system 
performance. Patching is the process of discovering, removing, and fixing areas of 
susceptibility in software. While patched software can be beneficial, poorly designed, 
poorly tested, and rushed patching software can open more attack vectors for a highly-
skilled adversary to exploit. A poorly designed patch could end up being more susceptible 
than the original software. Adversaries may be able to reverse engineer the patch to 
discover the weakness the patch was meant to protect. They can then use this information 
to attack cyber-physical systems that have not been updated with the new patch yet. 
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The training and proficiency of operators and maintenance crew members is also a 
vital concept that should not be overlooked. Regardless of how reliable our weapon 
platforms are on secure cyber-systems, there is always a human element. Humans, by 
nature, are not perfect. Training and proficiency of crew members involve improving the 
overall awareness of every service member’s role in keeping cyber-systems secure. Cyber-
based weapons are often delivered through web servers or through emails, USBs, or social 
media sites. Sufficient cyber-awareness training reduces the likelihood that an adversary is 
able to access password-protected systems or carry out a successful phishing attack. 
Cyberspace is inclusive of not only the code and data that travels through servers, but also 
the physical hardware needed for such data links. Protecting this hardware is equally as 
important as protecting the data on it. Training and proficiency include having security 
personnel well trained to protect essential aircraft hardware from adversary reconnaissance 
and insider threats. One annual online cyber awareness training is not sufficient for 
protecting our military’s systems that rely so heavily on the cyber domain. 
B. VULNERABILITY REDUCTION CONCEPTS FOR ACCS 
Reducing an aircraft’s cyber vulnerability presumes that the attacker has already 
triggered the cyber-warhead’s dysfunction mechanisms. Thus, these concepts are in place, 
not to prevent cyber-attacks, but to detect, respond to, and limit the functional damage of 
those cyber-attacks on combat aircraft in an attempt to reduce the likelihood that a hit 
results in a mission or aircraft kill.  
1. System Redundancy with Diversity 
System redundancy is the inclusion of hardware and software components that are 
not strictly necessary for an aircraft to function, but are included in the event that one or 
more flight or mission essential cyber systems fails (Ball, 2003). If one cyber component 
is compromised, another system with the same functionality can take its place. Redundant 
cyber systems should already be running, or should be capable of coming up to speed 
quickly, so that operators can switch over to the redundant system with minimal time lag. 
The concept of redundancy can be applied at the system, subsystem, or component level 
and can either be fully redundant or partially redundant (Ball, 2003). Fully redundant 
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systems are able to entirely perform the same functions as the primary system, while 
partially redundant components can only perform part of the functions that the primary 
system could otherwise perform.  
Having purely redundant systems is not enough however. If the redundant systems 
are identical to the primary systems with the same vulnerabilities, a single cyber-weapon 
could easily take out both out with the same malware (Bryant & Young, 2019). The same 
attack vectors can be exploited if redundant systems do not implement some level of 
diversity. Either having different hardware/software or having multiple versions of 
software available is necessary to reduce an aircraft’s vulnerability to a cyber-attack. While 
redundant systems should not be the same, they should have the same functionality as the 
components they intend to replace.  
One example of system redundancy in the cyber domain is backing up mission-
critical files and data, so that if those files are damaged, an older, back-up copy can be used 
with minimal effect. An advantage of this method of redundancy is that it can be entirely 
software based. It can be implemented without having to add equipment or hardware to the 
aircraft. However, there may be a small time delay as back-up files overwrite and reload 
software. 
Another potentially powerful way of implementing system redundancy is through 
virtualization (Bryant & Young, 2019). Virtualization is the process of running multiple 
virtual machines on a single piece of physical hardware. All of the virtual computers run 
as if they were the real computer, so that if the main computer is compromised, another 
unaffected computer is readily available. Virtual systems require a host operating system, 
a hypervisor, and a guest operating system (Xing & Zhan, 2012). Unfortunately, access to 
the hypervisor can give an adversary access to all of the virtual machines and the data 
associated within them, so protection of the hypervisor is absolutely critical.  
The host operating system provides all of the computing resources that enable the 
host and its virtual machines to run simultaneously and share information with one another. 
This can be a powerful tool for several reasons. Having multiple systems running 
simultaneously allows corrupted data and infected computers to be easily discarded and 
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replaced. It also enables the computers to check each other’s work. Theoretically, all of the 
computers should be running identically. A computer that is producing different results 
from the network of virtual machines indicates that a cyber-attack may be present. 
Redundancy of cyber components reduces vulnerability by reducing the likelihood that the 
dysfunctions caused by an attack on primary cyber systems cannot be restored by redundant 
systems that offer similar functionalities. 
2. Component Location and Logical Separation 
Component location is the physical or logical positioning of critical cyber 
components such that the probability that a dysfunction mechanism will result in a mission 
or aircraft kill is reduced. In traditional ACS, the concept of component location involves 
shielding critical components with non-critical components or physically separating 
critical components such that a single hit is less likely to take out multiple components 
(Ball, 2003). There is some importance to the physical location of cyber hardware, but the 
logical separation of the cyber-system’s data and software is a more important concept for 
reducing cyber vulnerability. There have been instances of physical damage caused by 
cyber-based attacks. In the event of physical damage, physical separation of cyber 
components is important so that the damage done to one piece of hardware does not also 
damage nearby hardware.  
While the actual location of cyber hardware is important in the event that a cyber-
attack causes physical damage, the virtual location of the data and software that runs on 
that hardware is even more important when designing survivable cyber systems. Cyber 
logic refers to the infrastructure organization, software architecture, design pattern, and 
communication networks between cyber-physical systems on an aircraft. Similar to the 
purpose of physical separation, logical separation can be used to reduce an aircraft’s 
vulnerability by preventing a single cyber-attack from denying, disrupting, or destroying 
multiple components. The easiest way to implement logical separation is by physically 
separating an aircraft’s cyber networks. 
Logical separation of cyber components prevents an adversary from navigating a 
protected combat cyber network by reducing its level of  connectivity. Compartmentalizing 
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damage is key to the concept of component location. Cyber components do not necessarily 
need to be air-gapped from one another (although this would be highly effective), but logic 
software should be in place that prevents an adversary who has gained access to one cyber-
component from gaining access to other components. 
3. Component Elimination or Replacement 
Completely getting rid of a non-critical cyber component or substituting a critical 
cyber component with a less vulnerable component with similar functionality reduces an 
aircraft’s vulnerability to cyber-attacks (Ball, 2003). While designing physically and 
logically separated cyber components with sufficient redundancies reduces a combat 
aircraft’s vulnerability to cyber-attacks, the vulnerability is reduced to zero if those 
vulnerable components are removed altogether. It is impossible to attack hardware or 
software that is not there.  
The key to component elimination is to determine whether or not the component in 
question is mission-critical and whether or not that component is worth an increased level 
of risk. For example, downloading maintenance data in flight may be more convenient than 
waiting until after landing, but having an open communication link operating in flight may 
not be worth the risk of opening a potential cyber-attack vector (Bryant & Young, 2019). 
Maintenance personnel are often proponents of sharing more flight and maintenance data 
across more devices because it improves efficiency and effectiveness; security personnel 
are often proponents of restricting the amount of data shared across devices for security 
reasons (Ball & Bryant, 2020c). The level of connectivity between an aircraft and 
supporting systems should be carefully examined to balance performance and security. 
While modern, high-tech combat aircraft may offer attractive additional features, 
not all of the bells and whistles that come with more technologically advanced aircraft may 
be worth the larger attack surface. It is important to make these risk decisions early in the 
program’s lifecycle, before millions of dollars are spent on the aircraft’s bells and whistles. 
An alternative to entirely eliminating a cyber-component is to replace a more 
vulnerable component with a less vulnerable component that can perform the same 
functions. Vulnerability is reduced when a component with a larger attack surface (i.e., has 
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more potential points of access) can be replaced with a component with a smaller attack 
surface. High-tech cyber components with more sophisticated code and cyber 
infrastructure might need to be replaced with more robust cyber components that are less 
likely to dysfunction in the event of a cyber-attack. It is important to keep in mind that a 
replacement component may introduce new cyber kill modes that were not there 
previously. The new component might still be less vulnerable, but only if these new kill 
modes are properly addressed. 
4. Component Shielding 
Component shielding is the process of guarding an aircraft’s critical cyber 
components from the dysfunction mechanisms of a cyber-based attack using additional 
protective layers. Component shielding in the cyber domain is analogous to component 
shielding in the physical domain in that its purpose is to add extra layers of defense to 
critical components to protect them from damage after a warhead has a successful hit an 
aircraft (Ball, 2003). Rather than adding a physical armored coating or plating to protect a 
critical component from KEWs, component shielding in the cyber domain involves adding 
additional security measures to detect an attack and prevent it from causing a critical 
component dysfunction. The goal of shielding cyber components is to reduce vulnerability 
by detecting an attack and preventing it from causing serious damage to an aircraft and its 
cyber systems through layers of securities, firewalls, and protocols.  
Designing hardware with a secure root of trust is one way of shielding components 
from cyber-attacks. For secure roots of trust, thorough identification and authentication are 
required before external devices can connect to flight hardware. This helps ensure that 
communication channels are secure. Another method for shielding an aircraft’s cyber 
components is by adding switches, certificates, and signings to control who can and cannot 
write to a component’s memory (Ball & Bryant, 2020c). These security measures prevent 
writing system updates unless the update is physically activated by a trusted operator. 
An important part of component shielding in ACCS is the ability to sense and detect 
when an aircraft’s cyber systems are under attack. In the physical domain, it is relatively 
easy to know whether or not an aircraft was hit by a gun or missile. It is harder in the cyber 
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domain to recognize if dysfunctions are due to a hostile cyber-attack or due to a typical 
operator or maintenance issue. It is also more difficult to determine which cyber-systems 
are being attacked. Cyber-weapons, by nature, are meant to be covert. A well-designed 
cyber-attack will try to hide the dysfunction or make the dysfunction appear as if it were a 
routine problem. Having active or passive sensors onboard that can see if cyber-systems 
are running correctly is vital to improving the likelihood of survival from a successfully 
implemented cyber-attack. Without the effective sensing and detecting of an attack, it 
becomes much less likely that the correct course of action will be taken to mitigate the 
dysfunction mechanisms.  
5. Dysfunction Suppression 
Dysfunction suppression describes any active or passive design technique or feature 
that reduces cyber vulnerability by containing functional damage or reducing its effects 
(Ball, 2003). Passive dysfunction suppression features are features that occur automatically 
in the event of a cyber-attack. Active dysfunction suppression features require some level 
of operator action, and therefore require a degree of situational awareness. 
Passive design techniques include the use of onboard sensors that can monitor 
cyber-systems and software tools that can automatically reload and reboot systems under 
attack. Passive features may also be capable of automatically repairing damaged software 
or data if it recognizes inconsistencies. Passive dysfunction suppression features should be 
capable of responding to unanticipated commands and irregular data. Examples of passive 
dysfunction suppression methods include implementing damage-tolerant components, 
scrambling techniques, and systems designed to postpone failure.  
Damage-tolerant components are components that can accept a degree of functional 
damage without losing their ability to function normally. This can be done by loading 
multiple paths of communication onto hardware so that if one path is damaged, the 
component can still send and receive data via an alternative route.  Scrambling devices 
transpose or invert signals so that data is unintelligible without the complimentary 
unscrambling device. Scrambling techniques could be used on the binary level to better 
synchronize data between networks and software (Bryant & Young, 2019). 
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Synchronization is important because it ensures that two or more locations share the same 
data. Delayed failure techniques can also be used so that elements of cyber components 
can still operate for a period of time after they have been attacked. 
The active dysfunction suppression features might include the pilot restoring 
software to a previously saved setting or physically shutting down infected hardware. If an 
operator is able to accurately notice an attack and determine which systems are being 
affected, they can respond accordingly. Situational awareness is therefore necessary before 
operators can effectively implement active dysfunction suppression techniques.  
The use of highly-skilled cyber teams can also be used to suppress functional 
damage from an ongoing cyber-attack (Bryant & Young, 2019). Cyber defense teams 
would have to intimately know the aircraft’s mission and cyber-physical systems and 
would need remote access to those systems. Cyber teams may be able to remotely monitor 
and locate an active attack, and respond to it accordingly. While cyber teams would provide 
the knowledge and expertise necessary for recognizing and responding to attacks, an open 
link would be required to monitor data flow. This open link between the aircraft and support 
systems would introduce an appealing attack vector for adversaries to exploit. The benefit 
of having these cyber teams may not be worth the risk. 
6. Recovery 
Recovery is the ability of an aircraft to either return to a normal state of operation 
or be safely grounded so that problems can be further assessed. After a cyber-attack has 
been successfully implemented, if the functional damage caused by the attack has not been 
entirely suppressed, the next step is to try to recover the aircraft and its information. This 
recovery step occurs after the cyber warhead has hit the aircraft and the dysfunction 
mechanism has taken full effect. If normal operations cannot continue, it is then the job of 
the pilot and supporting ground crew to get the aircraft grounded so that they can take a 
more in-depth look into what caused the dysfunction and who launched the attack. If the 
attack and the resulting dysfunctions do not pose an immediate threat to the survival of the 
physical aircraft, operators may continue to try to carry out the mission. 
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One design feature that would improve the likelihood of an aircraft could returning 
to a normal state of operation is the use of fail-safe responses. Overwriting and reloading 
essential software may get rid of the implanted malware. If it does not, reverting to a safe, 
older version of software saved on the device’s memory could do the trick. 
Another way an aircraft could recover from a cyber-attack is by manually 
overriding non-essential cyber-systems. Combat aircraft have not always relied so heavily 
on complex cyber systems. It is naïve to believe that today’s combat aircraft could be 
effective without any reliance on cyber-systems, but some of the more complex cyber 
components could be backed up with either manual components or components with 
primitive software and basic functionality. In the event that one of these more complex 
components is attacked, the pilot could switch over to less cyber-reliant components. This 
would be analogous to a basic “get home” mode (Ball & Bryant, 2020c). The loss of some 
functionality is better than losing the entire aircraft.  
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VI. SIMULATING A CYBER-ATTACK USING THE 
PROBABILISTIC KILL CHAIN 
A. CHALLENGES TO MODELING A CYBER-ATTACK 
The ACS engagement level probabilistic kill chain (Figure 2) briefly discussed in 
Chapter II can access the susceptibility, vulnerability, and overall survivability of a combat 
aircraft subject to a single shot from a kinetic energy weapon. This probabilistic kill chain 
was then modified in Chapter IV to address the phases and associated probabilities of an 
anti-aircraft cyber-attack (Figure 6). While these probabilistic kill chains are not perfect 
representations of real-life scenarios, they can be useful models for assessing platform 
survivability. Defenders can better implement survivability enhancement features to reduce 
an anti-aircraft weapon’s effectiveness if the sequence of steps that a weapon must go 
through to hit and kill a target is  well understood (Ball & Bryant, 2020b).  
While the math behind these probabilistic kill chains is relatively simple, assigning 
accurate probabilities to each phase can be quite challenging (Ball & Bryant, 2020b). This 
is especially true for ACCS. One of the most tried and true methods for determining the 
phase probabilities of an anti-aircraft weapon is by using historical data. In ACS, a long, 
detailed historical record of kinetic aircraft engagements is used to develop reasonable and 
credible probability ranges. There is no such historical data for anti-aircraft cyber weapons.  
Another advantage that ACS has over ACCS in this regard is the ability to 
accurately model the physics of a kinetic attack and back up computer calculations with 
live fire testing and evaluation (LFT&E) (Bryant, 2019). Testing the effectiveness of an 
anti-aircraft cyber-warhead in a laboratory is much more difficult because the cyber 
domain is so extensive. Most kinetic anti-aircraft threats are known and well researched. 
This is not the case in the cyber domain. Cyber-attacks are generally more interactive, 
creative, and complex than traditional kinetic energy attacks, making it much more 
challenging for defenders to determine a cyber-weapon’s probability of success or failure.  
For these reasons, the ACCS kill chain’s phase probabilities are likely to have much 
higher levels of uncertainty than what would be expected for kinetic energy weapons. 
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While some uncertainty is unavoidable without more historical or testing data, there are 
methods that can decrease a model’s uncertainty and help produce useful results. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
This first and most important step to modeling the ACCS probabilistic kill chain 
was to accurately determine the cyber-attack’s phase probabilities (Figure 6). Because of 
the current lack of historical data on anti-aircraft cyber weapons, the phase probabilities 
would have to be approximated using subject matter experts (SMEs) and confidence 
intervals (CI) (Bryant, 2019).  
Given that high levels of uncertainty are expected with cyber weapons, instead of 
asking experts for probabilities as single point values, a more realistic approach would be 
to ask them for ranges of expected probabilities. For example, a cybersecurity expert could 
say with 90% confidence that the probability of launch given detection for a cyber-weapon 
might be 40-75%. This range of probabilities could then be used as bounds to provide the 
relative likelihood of outcomes using probability distributions.  
For modeling and simulation, the shape of the distribution is very important. We 
cannot simply assume that the phase probability distributions are normal. In this case, given 
how much uncertainty there is and how little data there is on the topic, assuming normal 
probability distributions may be inappropriate.  
Likewise, assuming a uniform distribution, in which every outcome in a given 
range is equally likely to occur, might also be unfitting. A uniform distribution assumes 
that the likelihood of occurrence between upper and lower parameters is arbitrary. If 
experts could only confidently predict the probability of launch given detection lay 
somewhere between 40% and 75%, then a uniform distribution might be appropriate. 
However, if an expert were able to give a realistic estimate as to where along that 40-70% 
range they think the probability of success is most likely to occur, a triangular prediction 
would be a better approach. 
Triangular distributions are commonly used in risk and uncertainty analysis when 
relationships between variables are presumed but there is limited sample data available 
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(Johnson, 2002). Triangular distributions are typically favored for cases when subject 
matter experts attempt to reflect the overall subjective probability distributions for 
variables where limited data is available (Book et al., 2016). Given the high levels of 
uncertainty, the lack of underlying data, and that expert opinions are inherently subjective, 
triangular distributions were a good place to start for predicting phase probabilities.  
These distributions are based  on a minimum expected value, maximum expected 
value, and an “inspired guess” as to the most likely value (Hesse, 2000). From these three 
data points, a triangular probability distribution can be created according to Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Triangular distribution 
Triangular distributions are intentionally not smooth because they are based on only 
a few data points. It is also important to note that many triangular distributions are not 
symmetrical. The likelihood of launch given detection might range from 40-75%, but the 
most likely probability could be on either the lower or the higher end of that. The mean, or 




           (5) 
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where a is the minimum, b is the maximum, c is the modal value, and 𝜇 is the mean 
of the triangular distribution.  
To further increase the validity (and decrease the uncertainty) of the ACCS kill 
chain’s phase probabilities, instead of asking one SME, a group of SMEs could be 
questioned. While one expert might say that the probability of launch given detection is 
40-75% with a probability of 60% being most likely, another might think that the 
probability of launch given detection is closer to 70-90% with a probability of 80% being 
most likely. By asking many SMEs for their minimum, maximum, and most likely 
probabilities, a comprehensive triangular distribution could be determined by averaging 
the experts’ opinions for each phase of the kill chain. 
One potential shortcoming of using subject matter experts to determine 
probabilities is the human tendency to be overconfident (Ball & Bryant, 2020b). 
Psychological studies have shown that when people provide 90% confidence intervals on 
estimates, the actual values lay outside of their confidence interval more than half the time 
(Moore, 2018). Fortunately, there are proven techniques that can reduce the effect of 
overconfidence bias and produce predictions that are more accurate (Hubbard, 2014). 
These techniques should be taught to the SMEs before they are used to determine the ACCS 
kill chain’s phase probability distributions. 
Actual experts were not consulted to obtain phase probability data. Instead, 
minimum, maximum, and most likely estimates were made up merely to represent possible 
predictions from twenty SMEs. The ‘expert’ predictions and resulting triangular 
distribution for the probability of launch given detection are shown below for reference 
(Table 3) (Figure 9). Similar data tables were produced for the other five kill chain phases 















A 0.4 0.73 0.94 
B 0.5 0.67 0.8 
C 0.75 0.92 1 
D 0.4 0.68 0.95 
E 0.2 0.48 0.8 
F 0.25 0.53 0.77 
G 0.55 0.61 0.75 
H 0.24 0.5 0.83 
I 0.62 0.71 0.97 
J 0.58 0.68 0.92 
K 0.7 0.93 1 
L 0.76 0.84 0.96 
M 0.1 0.31 0.63 
N 0.29 0.45 0.78 
O 0.27 0.53 0.87 
P 0.65 0.86 1 
Q 0.5 0.75 1 
R 0.7 0.88 1 
S 0.66 0.9 1 
T 0.45 0.69 0.95 




Figure 9. Launch phase triangular distribution 
The simulation for this paper was done purely for proof of concept. For real-life 
cyber survivability assessment applications, actual, calibrated SMEs should be questioned 
and that data should be used to determine the appropriate triangular probability 
distributions. 
Because conditional phase probabilities in the ACS kill chain are single point 
values, the overall likelihood of events can be determined by multiplying subsequent 
branches. However, unlike the point values used in ACS, the probability distributions used 
for ACCS cannot simply be multiplied together (Ball & Bryant, 2020b). Instead, a Monte 
Carlo simulation was used to randomize the phase probabilities based on each phase’s 
triangular distribution. For each trial, a random probability was assigned to each of the 
phases based on the respective triangular distributions. For example, the probability of 
launch given detection for trial one could be anything between 0.478 and 0.896, with a 
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greater likelihood that the assigned probability would be closer to 0.683 than either of the 
two extremes (Figure 9).  
Another random number was generated between zero and one for each phase. This 
random number was then compared to the assigned phase probability. If the random 
number was less than the assigned phase probability, then the trial moved on to the next 
phase of the kill chain. If the random number was greater than the assigned phase 
probability, then the kill chain was broken and the attack stopped. If the attack moved on 
to the next phase, a new phase probability was assigned based off its own respective 
triangular distribution and was compared to a new random number between zero and one 
to determine if the outcome was successful or not. This was done for each of the six phases, 
starting from the active phase and ending after the kill phase (Figure 6). The simulation 
was then repeated for one million trials and the results were tabulated and averaged. The 
distribution of calculated survival probabilities was also used to determine the overall 
uncertainty of the final results.  
Monte Carlo simulations typically use tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands 
of trials. For this model, given unusually high levels of uncertainty for each of six 
independent phases, more iterations were required. The number of trials necessary for this 




= 𝐿𝑂𝑃     (6) 
Where ?̅? (3.29) was the z-statistic based off a desired 99% certainty in results, s 
was the standard deviation (0.0198), LOP was the desired level of precision, and N was the 
minimum number of trials necessary to obtain the desired level of precision. The standard 
deviation was determined by running the simulation with only 1,000 iterations and 
calculating the standard deviation from the probability of survival results. Using Equation 
6, at least 425,000 Monte Carlo iterations were required to achieve a level of precision of 
0.01%. This number was increased to one million for this study because the simulation 
algorithm used was relatively simple, computing power was available, and run-times 
remained reasonably short. A more complex cyber survivability assessment model would 
not require this many iterations. 
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C. SIMULATION TEST SCENARIOS 
The Monte Carlo simulation was run for three test scenarios. The first test scenario 
was for an aircraft without survivability enhancement features (SEFs). The second test 
scenario was for an aircraft with only one SEF. Six total simulations were run for scenario 
two, each with a single SEF reducing the effectiveness of a different phase of the kill chain: 
1. Reduce probability of active by using cyber threat suppression techniques 
(Threat Suppression) 
2. Reduce probability of detection by air-gapping systems (Signature 
Reduction/Management) 
3. Reduce probability of launch given detection by threating retaliation 
(Tactics, System Performance, and Crew Training & Proficiency) 
4. Reduce probability of implantation given launch by using multi-factor 
authentication (Cybersecurity Hardening) 
5. Reduce probability of hit given implantation by using active monitoring 
(Situational Awareness) 
6. Reduce probability of kill given hit by using virtualization techniques 
(System Redundancy with Diversity) 
Each of the six SEFs were assumed to reduce the likelihood of their respective 
phases by 15-20%. The SEFs for scenario two were implemented two ways: proportionally 
and disproportionally. The SEFs were implemented disproportionally by simply 
subtracting a random number between 0.15 and 0.2 from the assigned phase probabilities 
for each trial. The proportional method multiplied the assigned phase probability by a 
random number between 0.8 and 0.85. The second test scenario was done to determine if 
there were an optimal phase to attempt to break the kill chain. 
The third and final test scenario was for an aircraft with all six SEFs. While the 
survivability of an aircraft is expected to increase as more SEFs are added, a cost-benefit 
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analysis should be done to determine if the addition of more SEFs is worth the monetary 
or performance cost.  
A copy of the MATLAB script used to run these Monte Carlo simulations can be 
found in Appendix B. 
D. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
1. Test Scenario One: No Survivability Enhancement Features 
For the first test case, no survivability enhancement features were used to reduce 
the effectiveness of the anti-aircraft cyber weapon. Figure 10 below verifies that the Monte 
Carlo phase probabilities from the one million trials closely fit the expected triangular 
probability distributions for each phase of the kill chain. 
 
Figure 10. Triangular probability distributions for each phase 
Figure 11 summarizes the results for the first test case. The numbers on each branch 
represent the number of events that occurred over the course of one million trials. The 
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numbers in parenthesis represent the conditional probabilities for each branch based on the 
Monte Carlo simulation. The theoretical probability of survival was determined using the 
means of the probability distributions above (Equation 5). The experimental probability of 
survival was determined by subtracting the ratio of killed aircraft to total trails by one 
(Equation 7).  
𝑃𝑆, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 1 −
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡 𝐾𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠
           (7) 
 
Figure 11. Simulating a cyber-attack on an aircraft without SEFs 
The experimental probability of survival was only one-hundredth of a percent off 
from what was expected. We can therefore conclude that one million trials were more than 
sufficient for determining overall probabilities, even though the uncertainty for any single 
given trial may have been higher. From this simulation, the anti-aircraft cyber weapon 
killed 3.11% of aircraft and 96.89% of aircraft survived.  
77 
While 96.89% represents the most likely probability of survival, it does not mean 
that every similar engagement will have exactly a 96.89% chance of surviving. It is 
important to note that there is still a level of uncertainty in the overall probability of 
survival. This uncertainty was calculated by multiplying the unique conditional 
probabilities from each trial together, plotting them on a histogram, and fitting a 
distribution curve to the results. Figure 12 shows the probability of survival distribution 
based on the Monte Carlo simulation. 
 
Figure 12. Probability of survival distribution without SEFs 
While the mean geometric mean of the data set was 0.969, the probability of 
survival ranged from 0.851 to 0.997. This means that for any given attack, the probability 
of survival could differ by almost 15%. Only 1% of survival probabilities however fell 
below 0.926, so while a probability of 0.851 is possible, it is highly unlikely in this case. 
The standard deviation was 0.014 and the skewness was -1.0605. The negative skewness 
means that the probability is more likely to fall on the left side of the peak (or mode) than 
on the right side of the peak. While averaging the results can provide a realistic single value 
for the probability of survival given a cyber-attack (0.969), the entire probability 
distribution gives a more complete picture for assessing survivability. The probability 
distribution shows how much uncertainty is in the survivability estimation. 
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2. Test Scenario Two: One Survivability Enhancement Feature 
For the second test scenario, one survivability enhancement feature was added to 
the model. For the first round of simulations, each of the SEFs was assumed to decrease 
the respective phase probabilities disproportionately. Conditional phase probabilities were 
simply decreased by 0.15 to 0.20, one at a time. The first run assumed that only 𝑃𝐴 could 
be reduced, the second run assumed that only 𝑃𝐷|𝐴 could be reduced, and so on. The 
simulation was repeated for each of the six phases. Figure 13 shows how implementing 




   
a) Reducing only 𝑃𝐴    b) Reducing only 𝑃𝐷|𝐴 
   
c) Reducing only 𝑃𝐿|𝐷    d) Reducing only 𝑃𝐼|𝐿  
   
e) Reducing only 𝑃𝐻|𝐼    f) Reducing only 𝑃𝐾|𝐻 
Figure 13. Comparing single SEF effectiveness 
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The numbers above the ‘killed’ bar represent the total number of aircraft killed out 
of one million when a single SEF was implemented. As a reference, in the simulation 
without any SEFs (test scenario one) 31,095 (3.11%) aircraft were killed. As expected, a 
reduction in any of the six phase probabilities resulted in an overall decrease in the 
probability of kill. Each case with a SEF resulted in less kills than the case without SEFs. 
Figure 13 also shows that SEFs implemented at one location in the kill chain had no effect 
on previous phases. This is because the kill chain is time-wise and linear; it only moves in 
one direction. In this model, SEFs were limited to reducing only one phase probability. In 
reality, many survivability enhancement features can reduce a cyber-weapon’s 
effectiveness at many points along the kill chain.  
Figure 14 compares the probability of survival distributions for each of the test 
scenarios. 
 
Figure 14. Probability of survival distribution with one SEF (disproportional) 
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Although each SEF reduced their respective phase probability by the same amount 
(0.15-0.20), they did not all have the same effectiveness. Reducing 𝑃𝐴 enhanced 
survivability the least, while reducing 𝑃𝐷|𝐴 and 𝑃𝐻|𝐼 enhanced survivability the most. The 
reason for this had to do with the initial phases probability distributions determined by the 
SMEs (Figure 10). The active phase had the highest expected probability of success, while 
the detect and hit phases had the lowest expected probabilities of success. 
This result is important because it can inform defenders of where they should focus 
their attention. More effort should be placed on further reducing the phases of the kill chain 
that are believed to have the lowest probabilities of success. This, in effect, bottlenecks the 
attack at one point, stopping the majority of attacks from advancing further along the kill 
chain. If one phase’s probability can be reduced to zero, it would be impossible to kill that 
aircraft with a cyber-weapon.   
The same test was run a second time with proportional reductions in phase 
probabilities. Instead of subtracting 0.15 to 0.20 from the phase probabilities, the 




Figure 15. Probability of survival distribution with one SEF (proportional) 
Unlike the previous case, if each option proportionally reduces the phase’s 
probability of success by the same amount, focusing on one phase of the kill chain over 
another has no effect on the overall survivability of the aircraft. The distributive property 
tells us that when taking the product of a set of probabilities, it does not matter if the 0.825 
(average amount or reduction in this case) is multiplied first or last; the outcome will be 
the same. If all options are expected to enhance survivability proportionally, defenders 
should choose the easiest or least expensive option. 
3. Test Scenario Three: All Survivability Enhancement Features 
The third test scenario tested the survivability of an aircraft with all six survivability 
enhancement features. For this simulation, all six of the phase probabilities were reduced 
by 15-20%. Figures 16 and 17 below compares two aircraft: one without SEFs and one 
with multiple SEFs. Figure 16 shows where the kill chains were broken. Figure 17 
compares the probability distributions. 
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Figure 16. Event outcomes for cases with and without SEFs 
 
Figure 17. Probability of survival distributions for cases with and without 
SEFs 
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Both figures show that SEFs can drastically increase the survivability of a combat 
aircraft. Decreasing each phase probability by only 15-20% resulted in a 91.3% reduction 
in the aircraft’s killability. Based on the Monte Carlo results, the probability of survival for 
the aircraft without SEFs was 96.88%, while the probability of survival for the aircraft with 
SEFs was 99.73%.   
Figure 17 also shows that enhancing survivability can decrease uncertainty. The 
range and standard deviation were each much smaller for the case with SEFs than for the 
case without SEFs. The ranges for the cases with and without SEFs were 0.9694-1.0000 
and 0.8562-0.9968 respectively; the standard deviations for the cases with and without 
SEFs were 0.0023 and 0.0140 respectively. 
While full-scale testing and evaluation may not be possible for predicting the 
outcomes of cyber-attacks as they are for predicting the outcomes of KEWs, some testing 
can be done to help validate cyber survivability assessment results. Red teams are 
composed of friendly cyber experts that assume the role of an attacker to test a system’s 
cybersecurity. Red teams can be used to imitate enemy cyber-attack techniques in an 
attempt to detect weaknesses and assess a platform’s level of security. By simulating 
attacks with red teams, analysts can validate or modify predictions and defenders can learn 
what areas of the kill chain need to be better protected. 
As a reminder, the purpose of these simulations was simply to prove that anti-
aircraft cyber-attacks could be modeled and to quantitatively show how survivability can 
be enhanced with susceptibility and vulnerability reduction concepts. While the theory and 
mathematical process is sound, the numbers used for these simulations were largely made 
up and should not be taken as fact. Actual SMEs should be consulted to help assign ranges 




The Aircraft Combat Survivability design discipline has been tremendously 
successful in increasing the cost effectiveness of combat aircraft operating in man-made 
hostile environments. Until recently, the only serious anti-aircraft threat has been in the 
form of traditional, kinetic energy weapons; however, the rapid growth of technology, 
especially in the cyber domain, has given adversaries new tools to disrupt, degrade, deny, 
and destroy our combat systems. Cyber weapons pose a legitimate and dangerous threat to 
our combat aircraft’s ability to accomplish mission objectives and return home safely.  
The US military and its combat platforms have become almost entirely reliant on 
cyber-physical systems that operate in a domain that has yet to be well defined as a 
legitimate warfighting battlespace. As our combat aircraft continue to evolve with modern 
technologies, so too do the threats to those aircraft. Integrating aircraft with newer, more 
sophisticated cyber-components opens potential pathways for determined, highly capable 
adversaries to launch cyber-based attacks. For our adversaries, the covert nature of cyber 
operations and the potential to pack a large punch at a low cost and with low personal risk 
makes cyber-attacks an appealing alternative to kinetic energy weapons.  
Program managers, engineers, pilots, and maintenance personnel should always 
consider the cyber threat when designing and operating combat platforms. While Aircraft 
Combat Survivability has proven incredibly useful in defending combat aircraft from 
kinetic attacks, expanding the design discipline to address the emerging anti-aircraft cyber 
threat is necessary. We can improve an aircraft’s ability to avoid or withstand functional 
damage from a cyber-attack by applying the same ACS fundamentals to cyber weapons. 
While the dysfunction mechanisms and attack vectors for cyber-attacks are 
fundamentally different from those of traditional, kinetic energy weapons, a modified 
version of the ACS probabilistic kill chain can be incredibly useful in accessing an 
aircraft’s susceptibility and vulnerability to a cyber-attack. Many of the same ACS 
susceptibility and vulnerability reduction concepts for enhancing survivability against 
traditional KEWs can be used to enhance cyber-survivability. While there are many 
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parallels between the susceptibility and vulnerability reduction concepts for ACS and 
ACCS, the functions and implementations of the cyber-based susceptibility and 
vulnerability reduction concepts are much different. These concepts, if applied effectively, 
will help program managers and engineers design more survivable combat platforms. 
Finally, methods for assigning kill chain phase probabilities based on expert 
opinions and evaluating an aircraft’s cyber-survivability using Monte Carlo simulation 
techniques were proposed. The results from the survivability assessment model showed 
how survivability enhancement features could improve an aircraft’s ability to avoid or 
withstand functional damage caused by a cyber-attack. 
While this research specifically addressed anti-aircraft cyber threats, the ACCS 
concepts can be applied to any combat platform. Ships and ground vehicles also need to be 
survivable against cyber threats, and although some of the attack vectors and examples 
might not apply to all combat platforms, most of the survivability assessment and 
survivability enhancement concepts do. Cyber is an emerging threat, not just to combat 
aircraft, but to all military cyber systems. 
This area of study is relatively new. While this thesis attempts to establish some of 
the ACCS fundaments, further classified research should be done to assess the 
susceptibility and vulnerability of specific combat platforms and/or hardware. The ACS 
design discipline should also expand further to address how to defend against directed 
energy weapons, another emerging threat to combat aircraft. Lastly, industry-wide cyber-
survivability test and evaluation requirements should be proposed and incorporated to 
reduce the likelihood of aircraft-related cyber incidents. 
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APPENDIX  A. SME PROBABILITY DATA 
Table 4. Sample SME data for active phase 
Probability that 
Cyber Weapon 








A 0.8 0.9 1 
B 0.6 0.8 0.95 
C 0.85 0.95 1 
D 0.83 0.85 0.98 
E 0.74 0.89 0.99 
F 0.66 0.87 1 
G 0.85 0.92 1 
H 0.65 0.78 1 
I 0.8 0.9 0.94 
J 0.89 0.95 0.99 
K 0.9 0.98 1 
L 0.77 0.86 0.9 
M 0.85 0.92 0.95 
N 0.9 0.95 1 
O 0.95 0.99 1 
P 0.85 0.94 0.98 
Q 0.93 0.97 1 
R 0.95 0.98 1 
S 0.85 0.94 1 
T 0.72 0.83 0.95 















A 0.39 0.48 0.78 
B 0.15 0.45 0.71 
C 0.37 0.5 0.81 
D 0.26 0.44 0.6 
E 0.23 0.39 0.64 
F 0.12 0.21 0.46 
G 0.087 0.23 0.49 
H 0.058 0.27 0.71 
I 0.21 0.23 0.62 
J 0.25 0.31 0.66 
K 0.16 0.3 0.67 
L 0.39 0.49 0.64 
M 0.2 0.49 0.74 
N 0.16 0.32 0.64 
O 0.23 0.38 0.59 
P 0.19 0.24 0.67 
Q 0.11 0.38 0.57 
R 0.16 0.39 0.57 
S 0.33 0.47 0.67 
T 0.16 0.42 0.53 
















A 0.4 0.73 0.94 
B 0.5 0.67 0.8 
C 0.75 0.92 1 
D 0.4 0.68 0.95 
E 0.2 0.48 0.8 
F 0.25 0.53 0.77 
G 0.55 0.61 0.75 
H 0.24 0.5 0.83 
I 0.62 0.71 0.97 
J 0.58 0.68 0.92 
K 0.7 0.93 1 
L 0.76 0.84 0.96 
M 0.1 0.31 0.63 
N 0.29 0.45 0.78 
O 0.27 0.53 0.87 
P 0.65 0.86 1 
Q 0.5 0.75 1 
R 0.7 0.88 1 
S 0.66 0.9 1 
T 0.45 0.69 0.95 

















A 0.06 0.37 0.76 
B 0.3 0.47 0.82 
C 0.01 0.26 0.67 
D 0.11 0.37 0.57 
E 0.32 0.52 0.9 
F 0.17 0.4 0.85 
G 0.35 0.58 0.92 
H 0.27 0.41 0.68 
I 0.2 0.45 0.8 
J 0.11 0.34 0.72 
K 0.24 0.45 0.63 
L 0.05 0.44 0.9 
M 0.02 0.22 0.43 
N 0.29 0.51 0.89 
O 0.07 0.38 0.77 
P 0.2 0.32 0.45 
Q 0.04 0.19 0.65 
R 0.32 0.44 0.59 
S 0 0.15 0.45 
T 0.15 0.43 0.71 




















A 0.1 0.43 0.7 
B 0.35 0.47 0.76 
C 0.21 0.38 0.55 
D 0.18 0.46 0.85 
E 0.3 0.44 0.55 
F 0.24 0.36 0.61 
G 0.3 0.41 0.75 
H 0.22 0.45 0.64 
I 0.05 0.19 0.55 
J 0.16 0.36 0.5 
K 0.05 0.5 0.83 
L 0.28 0.45 0.58 
M 0.08 0.22 0.36 
N 0.05 0.4 0.61 
O 0.14 0.42 0.7 
P 0.28 0.44 0.55 
Q 0.31 0.47 0.65 
R 0.09 0.38 0.56 
S 0.2 0.39 0.76 
T 0.14 0.28 0.44 






Table 9. Sample SME data for kill phase 
Probability of 









A 0.57 0.67 0.75 
B 0.36 0.54 0.7 
C 0.54 0.67 0.92 
D 0.56 0.72 0.93 
E 0.88 0.94 1 
F 0.63 0.74 0.94 
G 0.57 0.77 0.83 
H 0.63 0.75 0.86 
I 0.55 0.6 0.68 
J 0.72 0.81 0.92 
K 0.45 0.57 0.77 
L 0.5 0.65 0.8 
M 0.4 0.59 0.73 
N 0.68 0.76 0.86 
O 0.7 0.85 1 
P 0.61 0.72 0.88 
Q 0.77 0.85 1 
R 0.65 0.8 0.95 
S 0.69 0.8 1 
T 0.59 0.7 0.8 






APPENDIX B. MONTE CARLO SIMULATION MATLAB SCRIPT 
%% Monte Carlo Simulation of an Anti-Aircraft Cyber-Attack 
% Based on ACCS Probabilistic Kill Chain 
% Run with and without Survivability Enhancement Features 
  
% Austin Weinman 
% ENS, United States Navy 




%% Read Data into MATLAB 
  
% Probability of Active 
PA_min = xlsread('ACCS_Data.xlsx', 1, 'C2:C21'); 
PA_mode = xlsread('ACCS_Data.xlsx', 1, 'D2:D21'); 
PA_max = xlsread('ACCS_Data.xlsx', 1, 'E2:E21'); 
  
% Probability of Detection given Active 
PD_min = xlsread('ACCS_Data.xlsx', 1, 'C24:C43'); 
PD_mode = xlsread('ACCS_Data.xlsx', 1, 'D24:D43'); 
PD_max = xlsread('ACCS_Data.xlsx', 1, 'E24:E43'); 
  
% Probability of Launch given Detection 
PL_min = xlsread('ACCS_Data.xlsx', 1, 'C46:C65'); 
PL_mode = xlsread('ACCS_Data.xlsx', 1, 'D46:D65'); 
PL_max = xlsread('ACCS_Data.xlsx', 1, 'E46:E65'); 
  
% Probability of Implantation given Launch 
PI_min = xlsread('ACCS_Data.xlsx', 1, 'C68:C87'); 
PI_mode = xlsread('ACCS_Data.xlsx', 1, 'D68:D87'); 
PI_max = xlsread('ACCS_Data.xlsx', 1, 'E68:E87'); 
  
% Probability of Hit given Implantation 
PH_min = xlsread('ACCS_Data.xlsx', 1, 'C90:C109'); 
PH_mode = xlsread('ACCS_Data.xlsx', 1, 'D90:D109'); 
PH_max = xlsread('ACCS_Data.xlsx', 1, 'E90:E109'); 
  
% Probability of Kill given Hit (Vulnerability) 
PK_min = xlsread('ACCS_Data.xlsx', 1, 'C112:C131'); 
PK_mode = xlsread('ACCS_Data.xlsx', 1, 'D112:D131'); 
PK_max = xlsread('ACCS_Data.xlsx', 1, 'E112:E131'); 
  
%% Triangular Distributions 
  
x = 0:.001:1; 
  
% Probability of Active 
PA_lower = mean(PA_min); 
PA_peak = mean(PA_mode); 
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PA_upper = mean(PA_max); 
PA_pd = makedist('triangular','a',PA_lower,'b',PA_peak,'c',PA_upper) 
y_PA = pdf(PA_pd,x); 
pa = (PA_lower+PA_peak+PA_upper)/3; 
  
% Probability of Detection given Active 
PD_lower = mean(PD_min); 
PD_peak = mean(PD_mode); 
PD_upper = mean(PD_max); 
PD_pd = makedist('triangular','a',PD_lower,'b',PD_peak,'c',PD_upper) 
y_PD = pdf(PD_pd,x); 
pdga = (PD_lower+PD_peak+PD_upper)/3; 
  
% Probability of Launch given Detection 
PL_lower = mean(PL_min); 
PL_peak = mean(PL_mode); 
PL_upper = mean(PL_max); 
PL_pd = makedist('triangular','a',PL_lower,'b',PL_peak,'c',PL_upper) 
y_PL = pdf(PL_pd,x); 
plgd = (PL_lower+PL_peak+PL_upper)/3; 
  
% Probability of Implantation given Launch 
PI_lower = mean(PI_min); 
PI_peak = mean(PI_mode); 
PI_upper = mean(PI_max); 
PI_pd = makedist('triangular','a',PI_lower,'b',PI_peak,'c',PI_upper) 
y_PI = pdf(PI_pd,x); 
pigl = (PI_lower+PI_peak+PI_upper)/3; 
  
% Probability of Hit given Implantation 
PH_lower = mean(PH_min); 
PH_peak = mean(PH_mode); 
PH_upper = mean(PH_max); 
PH_pd = makedist('triangular','a',PH_lower,'b',PH_peak,'c',PH_upper) 
y_PH = pdf(PH_pd,x); 
phgi = (PH_lower+PH_peak+PH_upper)/3; 
  
% Probability of Kill given Hit (Vulnerability) 
PK_lower = mean(PK_min); 
PK_peak = mean(PK_mode); 
PK_upper = mean(PK_max); 
PK_pd = makedist('triangular','a',PK_lower,'b',PK_peak,'c',PK_upper) 
y_PK = pdf(PK_pd,x); 
pkgh = (PK_lower+PK_peak+PK_upper)/3; 
  
%% Implementinng ACCS Survivability Enhancement Features 
  
% [all SEF's expected to reduce conditional probability by 15-20%]  
SEF = makedist('Uniform','lower',15,'upper',20); 
  
% Reducing Susceptibility 
    % Reducing Probability of Active 
        SEF_1 = random(SEF,1000000,1)/100; % Cyber Threat Suppression 
(Threat Suppression) 
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    % Reducing Probability of Detection given Active 
         SEF_2 = random(SEF,1000000,1)/100; % Air-Gapping (Signature 
Reduction/Management) 
    % Reducing Probability of Launch given Detection 
         SEF_3 = random(SEF,1000000,1)/100; % Threats of Retaliation 
(Tactics, etc..) 
    % Reducing Probability of Implantation given Launch 
         SEF_4 = random(SEF,1000000,1)/100; % Multi-factor 
Authentication (Cybersecurity Hardening) 
    % Reducing Probability of Hit given Implantation 
         SEF_5 = random(SEF,1000000,1)/100; % Active Monitoring 
(Situational Awareness) 
     
% Reducing Vulnerbality 
    % Reducing Probability of Kill given Hit 
         SEF_6 = random(SEF,1000000,1)/100; % Virtualization (System 
Redundancy with Diversity) 
  
  


















while n <= trials; 
% Phase I (Active) 
rA = random(PA_pd); 
RA = rand(1,1); 
rD = random(PD_pd); 
rL = random(PL_pd); 
rI = random(PI_pd); 
rH = random(PH_pd); 
rK = random(PK_pd); 
  
if RA < rA 
active = active+1; 
    % Phase II (Detect) 
    RD = rand(1,1); 
    if RD < rD 
    detect = detect+1; 
        % Phase III (Launch) 
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        RL = rand(1,1); 
        if RL < rL 
        launch = launch+1; 
            % Phase IV (Implant) 
            RI = rand(1,1); 
            if RI < rI 
            implant = implant+1; 
                % Phase V (Hit) 
                RH = rand(1,1); 
                if RH < rH 
                hit = hit+1; 
                    % Phase VI (Kill) 
                    RK = rand(1,1); 
                    if RK < rK 
                    kill = kill+1; 
                    else 
                    notkill = notkill+1; 
                    end 
                else 
                nothit = nothit+1; 
                end          
            else 
            notimplant = notimplant+1; 
            end 
        else 
        notlaunch = notlaunch+1; 
        end 
    else 
    notdetect = notdetect+1; 
    end 
else 
notactive = notactive+1; 
end 
  
rA_values(n,1) = rA; 
rD_values(n,1) = rD; 
rL_values(n,1) = rL; 
rI_values(n,1) = rI; 
rH_values(n,1) = rH; 
rK_values(n,1) = rK; 
  
n = n+1; 
end 
  



















while n2 <= trials2 
% Phase I (Active) 
rA2 = random(PA_pd)-SEF_1(n2); 
RA2 = rand(1,1); 
rD2 = random(PD_pd)-SEF_1(n2); 
rL2 = random(PL_pd)-SEF_1(n2); 
rI2 = random(PI_pd)-SEF_1(n2); 
rH2 = random(PH_pd)-SEF_1(n2); 
rK2 = random(PK_pd)-SEF_1(n2); 
  
if RA2 < rA2 
active2 = active2+1; 
    % Phase II (Detect) 
    RD2 = rand(1,1); 
    if RD2 < rD2 
    detect2 = detect2+1; 
        % Phase III (Launch) 
        RL2 = rand(1,1); 
        if RL2 < rL2 
        launch2 = launch2+1; 
            % Phase IV (Implant) 
            RI2 = rand(1,1); 
            if RI2 < rI2 
            implant2 = implant2+1; 
                % Phase V (Hit) 
                RH2 = rand(1,1); 
                if RH2 < rH2 
                hit2 = hit2+1; 
                    % Phase VI (Kill) 
                    RK2 = rand(1,1); 
                    if RK2 < rK2 
                    kill2 = kill2+1; 
                    else 
                    notkill2 = notkill2+1; 
                    end 
                else 
                nothit2 = nothit2+1; 
                end          
            else 
            notimplant2 = notimplant2+1; 
            end 
        else 
        notlaunch2 = notlaunch2+1; 
        end 
    else 
    notdetect2 = notdetect2+1; 
    end 
else 
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notactive2 = notactive2+1; 
end 
  
rA2_values(n2,1) = rA2; 
rD2_values(n2,1) = rD2; 
rL2_values(n2,1) = rL2; 
rI2_values(n2,1) = rI2; 
rH2_values(n2,1) = rH2; 
rK2_values(n2,1) = rK2; 
  
n2 = n2+1; 
end 
  
%% Calculating Probabilities 
% Probabilities of Success for each Phase (based on MC) 
PA = rA_values; 
PD = PA.*rD_values; 
PL = PD.*rL_values; 
PI = PL.*rI_values; 
PH = PI.*rH_values; 
PK = PH.*rK_values; 
  
    % Probabilities of Success for each Phase (based on MC) 
    PA2 = rA2_values; 
    PD2 = PA2.*rD2_values; 
    PL2 = PD2.*rL2_values; 
    PI2 = PL2.*rI2_values; 
    PH2 = PI2.*rH2_values; 
    PK2 = PH2.*rK2_values; 
  
% Theoretical Probabilities w/o SEF 
prob_active_t = pa; 
prob_detect_t = pa*pdga; 
prob_launch_t = prob_detect_t*plgd; 
prob_implant_t = prob_launch_t*pigl; 
prob_hit_t = prob_implant_t*phgi; 
prob_kill_t = prob_hit_t*pkgh; 
  
prob_survival_t = 1-prob_kill_t; 
  
% Calculating Conditional Probabilities (based on MC) 
PA = PA; 
PDgA = rD_values; 
PLgD = rL_values; 
PIgL = rI_values; 
PHgI = rH_values; 
PKgH = rK_values; 
  
    % Calculating Conditional Probabilities (based on MC) 
    PA2 = PA2; 
    PDgA2 = rD2_values; 
    PLgD2 = rL2_values; 
    PIgL2 = rI2_values; 
    PHgI2 = rH2_values; 
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    PKgH2 = rK2_values; 
  
% Probability of Kill and Probability of Survival (based on MC) 
PK = PK; 
PS = 1 - PK; 
  
    % Probability of Kill and Probability of Survival (based on MC) 
    PK2 = PK2; 
    PS2 = 1 - PK2; 
  
%% Plotting Results 
  




title('Probability of Active') 
yyaxis left 











title('Probability of Detection given Active') 
yyaxis left 










title('Probability of Launch given Detection') 
yyaxis left 










title('Probability of Implantation given Launch') 
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yyaxis left 










title('Probability of Hit given Implantation') 
yyaxis left 










title('Probability of Kill given Hit') 
yyaxis left 






legend ('Monte Carlo Results','Expected Triangular PDF') 
  
% Flow of Events 
Events = [active, detect, launch, implant, hit, kill]; 
Events2 = [active2, detect2, launch2, implant2, hit2, kill2]; 






ylabel('Successful Events out of 10,000 Trials') 
xticks([1 2 3 4 5 6]) 
xticklabels({'Active'; 'Detected'; 'Launched'; 'Implanted'; 'Hit'; 
'Killed'}) 
legend('Without SEFs','With SEF') 
  





title('Probability of Kill') 






title('Probability of Survival') 
xlabel('Probability') 
legend('Without SEFs','With SEF') 
  
Killed = kill 
    Killed2 = kill2 
Survived = trials - kill 
    Survived2 = trials2 - kill2 
MC_Prob_Kill = Killed/trials 
    MC_Prob_Kill2 = Killed2/trials2 
MC_Prob_Survival = Survived/trials 
    MC_Prob_Survival2 = Survived2/trials2 
  
Theoretical_Prob_Kill = prob_kill_t 
Theoretical_Prob_Survival = prob_survival_t 
  
% Descriptive Probability of Survival Statistics 
PS_percentiles = prctile(PS,[1 5 10 25 50 75 90 95 99]); 
PS_mean = geomean(PS); 
PS_std = nanstd(PS); 
PS_skewness = skewness(PS); 
PS_range = range(PS); 
PS_CV = PS_std/PS_mean; 
  
    % Descriptive Probability of Survival Statistics 
    PS2_percentiles = prctile(PS2,[1 5 10 25 50 75 90 95 99]); 
    PS2_mean = geomean(PS2); 
    PS2_std = nanstd(PS2); 
    PS2_skewness = skewness(PS2); 
    PS2_range = range(PS2); 
    PS2_CV = PS2_std/PS2_mean; 
     
%% Where should we focus our attention? 
     
pd_0 = fitdist(PS,'Kernel','Kernel','epanechnikov') 
pd_1 = fitdist(PS1,'Kernel','Kernel','epanechnikov') 
pd_2 = fitdist(PS2,'Kernel','Kernel','epanechnikov') 
pd_3 = fitdist(PS3,'Kernel','Kernel','epanechnikov') 
pd_4 = fitdist(PS4,'Kernel','Kernel','epanechnikov') 
pd_5 = fitdist(PS5,'Kernel','Kernel','epanechnikov') 
pd_6 = fitdist(PS6,'Kernel','Kernel','epanechnikov') 














legend('No SEFs','Focus on Active Phase','Focus on Detect Phase','Focus 
on Launch Phase','Focus on Implantation Phase','Focus on Hit 
Phase','Focus on Kill Phase') 
  
y0 = pdf(pd_0,x); 
y1 = pdf(pd_1,x); 
y2 = pdf(pd_2,x); 
y3 = pdf(pd_3,x); 
y4 = pdf(pd_4,x); 
y5 = pdf(pd_5,x); 
y6 = pdf(pd_6,x); 












xlabel('Probability of Survival') 
xlim([0.93 1]) 
legend('No SEFs','Focus on Active Phase','Focus on Detect Phase','Focus 
on Launch Phase','Focus on Implantation Phase','Focus on Hit 
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